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Preface 
This study on Strategic Directions on Industrial Policy in Mongolia combines analysis of long-term 
structural change and the role of industrial policy. It takes into account the contributions of policy-
makers, entrepreneurs, academics, directors of non-governmental organizations, officials from 
international organizations and other industrial stkeholders. The study suggests a strategy and a set of 
policies which aim to stimulate structural change into and within the manufacturing sector. Because of 
the importance of the mining sector for Mongolia’s economy, one section of the study examines the 
options for moving from resource-based industries into higher value-added manufacturing activities. 
In preparation for the study, two seminars were organized in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. The first seminar 
took place on 24-25 February 2010. The panelists in the workshop were Mr. John Weiss from the 
University of Bradford in the UK; Mr. Henrik Kuffner, an expert on wool and cashmere from the 
International Wool Textile Organization; and Mr. Ralph van Gelder, an independent consultant on 
meat processing. The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bolor Bayarbaatar, the Vice Minister for 
Agriculture and Light Industry, Mr. Zoljargal Hhadbaatar, and Mr. Ludovico Alcorta, Director of the 
Development Policy and Strategic Research Branch of UNIDO, opened the event. Ms. P. Pacheco 
López presented a preview of the methodology used for policy design on the project. Presentations on 
aspects of industrial and sub-sectoral development were made by the following Mongolian 
government officials, national experts, and representatives of the private sector: B. Ganbat, Director, 
Innovation Policy Department of the National Development and Innovation Committee; Mr. Bolor 
Naranhuu, national consultant; Mr. G. Yondonsambuu, Vice President of the Mongolian Wool and 
Cashmere Association; Mr. S. Gankhuyag, national consultant;  Mr. B. Batkhuu, Director, Mining and 
Heavy Industry Department of the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy; Mr. T. Tamir, Sub-
Division Director of the Mining Division of the Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia; Mr. M. 
Lhachinbal, Chair of the  Mongolian Meat Association; Mr. Ch. Ganbat, Adviser to the Minister of 
Roads, Transport, Construction and Urban Development. 
The second seminar took place on 3-4 June 2010. The Director of Trade and Economic Cooperation of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. G. Jargalsaikhan, the Director of Light Industry Policy 
Implementation and the Coordination Department of the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Light 
Industry, Mr. D. Badarch and Mr. Ludovico Alcorta, Director of the Development Policy and Strategic 
Research Branch of UNIDO, opened the event. The panlists were a group of international industrial 
policy experts assembled by UNIDO, and comprised Mr. John Weiss; Mr. Graham Davis from the 
Colorado School of Mines in the USA; Mr. Henrik Kuffner; and Mr. Ralph van Gelder. Presentations 
on different aspects of industrial and sub-sectoral development were made by Mongolian government 
officials, national experts, and representatives of the private sector: Mr. R. Batmend of the Mongolian 
Institute for Strategic Studies; Mr. B. Ganbaatar, Director, Sectoral Development and Investment 
Policy Co-ordination Department of the National Development and Innovation Committee; Mr. B. 
Battulga, Officer, Innovation Policy Department of the National Development and Innovation 
Committee; Mr. G. Yondonsambuu, Vice President of the Mongolian Wool and Cashmere 
Association; Mr. D. Enkhtuya, Director, Mongolian Textile Institute; Ms. L. Boojoo, Executive 
Director of the Competitiveness Centre, an NGO; Mr.B. Batkhuu, Director, Mining and Heavy 
Industry Department of the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy; and Mr. J. Baatarkhuu, 
General Director in Charge of Enrichment, Erdenet Mining Corporation. 
The study will contribute to Mongolia’s industrial policy-making process. Mongolia is currently at a 
crucial juncture in its development process and key strategic decisions are being taken to ensure long-
© United Nations Industrial Development Organization 2011 4 
term sustained growth. Industrialization will play  leading role in it and UNIDO is pleased to 
accompany the country in this major endeavour. 
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Strategic Directions on Industrial Policy in Mongolia 
Mongolia possesses major reserves of 80 different mi erals including copper, gold, coking coal, iron 
ore, fluorspar, molybdenum, and crude oil. The Oyu Tolgoi mine, in particular, is potentially the world 
largest copper mine. Unsurprisingly, the Mongolian economy has relied on its mining sector and the 
high prices of minerals in international markets for economic growth. However, the time has come for 
Mongolia to use revenues from mineral reserves to gr w even faster by inducing a rapid 
transformation of the economy and, as a result, improving significantly the living standards of its 
people. To do so, the development of a competitive and high value-added manufacturing sector is 
crucial. 
Several Mongolian official documents−including The Action Plan of the Government of Mongolia for 
2008-2012; The Millennium Development Goals-Based Comprehensive National Development 
Strategy of Mongolia; The Action Strategy and Formation Plan of the National Development and 
Innovation Committee; The List of Initial High Priority Large Projects to be Announced to Foreign 
and Domestic Investors by Government; and The Detailed List of Large Priority Projects to be 
Implemented by the Government − show the importance that the Government is giving to the 
development of an industrial programme. The goals are ambitious and involve developing a range of 
new industrial activities. To reach those goals and realize such ambitious projects, many obstacles will 
have to be surmounted. 
The manufacturing sector is small and accounted for only 4.3 per cent of gross domestic product in 
2008. Of the total economically active population of around 1 million people, only 48,000 were 
employed in the manufacturing sector. The small overall population limits the size of the domestic 
market. The challenge is thus to identify those manuf ctured products that it is feasible to support 
initially, in the sense that they use local raw materi ls, can be produced economically and compete in 
international markets. Empirical evidence has shown that countries that produce and export 
manufactured products experience faster long-term growth and are eventually able to diversify into 
even more advanced industries. 
This report, Strategic Directions on Industrial Policy, is based on an assessment of the current 
characteristics of the manufacturing sector, its contribution to the overall economy, the prevailing 
macroeconomic and institutional circumstances of the country, and its performance relative to other 
countries at the same stage of development. The aim is to define an industrial development strategy 
and make recommendations on industrial policy that m y help turn the industrial development goals 
and projects of the Government of Mongolia into reality. The development of Mongolia’s 
manufacturing is essential if it is to weather the s ocks associated with the volatile minerals markets. 
Historical and current empirical evidence show thatcountries which produce and export manufactured 
products have experienced a more stable economic performance, especially if their products are in 
demand in high-income countries.  The report is based on rigorous research assessing the performance 
of Mongolia’s most important sectors such as minerals, natural fibers and meat processing, but also 
suggests new areas of comparative advantage. 
Mongolia is a land-locked country, where distances are huge and transport costs high. Every effort 
needs to be made to improve the transport infrastructu e to lower transport costs. Additionally, an 
adequate and high-quality physical infrastructure should be built for production to be efficient and 
competitive. The institutional structure needs to be conducive to doing businesses. This means 
strengthening property rights and the rule of law, nd reducing the bureaucratic procedures for setting 
up businesses. For industry to flourish, it must alo have access to skilled professionals. Investment in 
Strategic Directions on Industrial Policy in Mongolia  
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education and training for specific industries should be seen as a key priority. Likewise, information 
and technology (IT) skills and foreign languages are of generic importance. 
An active dialogue between the Government and private sector must also be maintained to identify 
market failures and what the private sector sees as ‘binding constraints’ on industrial growth, so that 
the Government can target their removal. However, to achieve the goals, all parties including the 
Government, firms, industries and professionals, must take coordinated actions toward transformation. 
The industrial strategy will be based on two main pillars. First, improving the quality of manufactured 
products for specific niche markets. The country could improve the quality of those products which 
require unique Mongolian raw materials, design or processes. The establishment of a marketing 
structure and trade associations is vital to promote traditional products of Mongolian origin. There is 
great potential for exports of high value-added industrial products based on cashmere, yak hair, 
sheep’s wool, camel hair and red meat. Second, aggressively promoting Mongolian products in 
international markets.  Participation in specialized fairs, branding and active promotion of the products 
are examples of what could be done. In sum, Mongolian manufactures should be recognized for their 
quality, their unique identity and by price differentiation, for all of which a coherent marketing 
strategy is required. 
The success of the industrial strategy will be determined by the Government’s ability to: i) manage and 
use the revenues generated by the extraction of minerals and ii) decide which minerals to process. 
Regarding the former, a properly regulated and structu ed financial institution has to be established.  
Mongolian entrepreneurs wanting to produce manufactres need to have access to funds, which should 
be conditional on medium-term performance. Part of he sustainability of the financial institution 
would depend on a body of trained inspectors in charge of monitoring the small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) which seek its funds. Any move to support mineral value-added processing 
activities must be undertaken only after assessment of the profitability of each capital investment, 
identified through rigorous financial and technical analysis. For those processed minerals oriented 
towards international markets, the selection of export markets is a key issue. But there could also be 
social benefits, such as employment generation, when selecting a basket of processed minerals 
oriented to satisfy the domestic market. 
The vision is that in 20 years' time, Mongolia will have a much more diversified economy. 
Manufacturing industry will be a major driver of economic activity, with production taking place in 
modern, high-tech, environmentally friendly and resource-efficient plants. Most of its population will 
enjoy high -quality employment and higher incomes and the standards of living of the Mongolian 
population will begin approaching those of developed countries. 
Priorities for Industrial Development 
There is great potential to enhance the performance of the Mongolian industrial sector. For it to 
prosper, a set of issues needs to be addressed. Development of Mongolia’s plentiful mineral resources 
offers the opportunity for significant diversification, including the expansion of manufacturing. The 
role of government would be to co-ordinate the respon es of market participants to ensure that 
bottlenecks are overcome. The following are the priorities identified. 
Strategic Directions on Industrial Policy in Mongolia  
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It is critical to overcome the shortage of long-term finance for investment and it will be necessary to 
use mineral revenues to fund the diversification of the economy.  
 
1. Mongolia’s economic development requires the channelli g of long-term investment funds 
into the manufacturing sector. Funds for new activities – whether defined as new to the 
country or as new ways of doing things – should be channelled through a Development Bank, 
a venture capital fund or an alternative financial intermediary. The Development Bank should 
lend at preferential rates (based on international i terest rates with an adjustment for 
administrative costs). 
2. For employment purposes, a separate fund for SMEs (defined as enterprises with less than 50 
employees) should be created. Funds should carry an interest rate that reflects risk-free returns 
abroad plus administration charges. SMEs should not be expected to bear foreign exchange 
risk. 
3. A Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) should be created to invest some of the mineral revenues in 
foreign-exchange-denominated assets to sterilize the impact of mineral revenues on the 
exchange rate and to create a fund to offset downturns in mineral prices. 
4. A Technology Development Fund should be set up to cover the cost of the import and/or local 
development of new technology and the cost of employment of foreign experts. Loans offered 
under this fund should be small (say, a maximum US$10 million per loan) and offered 
interest-free. 
5. Enterprises from all sectors of industry should be eligible to apply for funds, but failure to 
repay would render the enterprises and their owners i ligible for further financial support for 
a significant period of time (say, ten years). 
Planning for the future development of the mineral sector is critical. It cannot be assumed that a 
strategy for processing minerals is always economically feasible. 
 
6. The planning capacity of the National Development ad Innovation Committee and other 
bodies dealing with the mineral sector should be str ngthened by a combination of training for 
local staff and the involvement of foreign advisers and consultancy firms. Detailed work must 
be carried out that meets rigorous international standards and leads to sound technical advice.  
7. It may turn out that it is economically more advisable for Mongolia to run a dual economy, 
exporting selected unprocessed and processed minerals and expanding resource-based 
manufactures (like textiles, cashmere, and food products), initially funded by the mining 
sector. 
Improvements to the investment climate must continue. 
 
8. Ongoing initiatives to reduce the cost of doing busine s, for example through investment in 
infrastructure, the streamlining of bureaucratic processes and the strengthening of legal 
protection must be maintained. 
Institutional change at sector level will be essential to allow modernization. 
 
9. Co-ordination among the different official entities dealing with the same areas (for example, 
between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of F od, Agriculture and Light Industries) is 
necessary in order to make policy consistent.  
Strategic Directions on Industrial Policy in Mongolia  
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10. There needs to be dialogue between the Government and the private sector where bottlenecks 
and market failures are identified. The Government must play a co-ordinating and facilitating 
role to remove these. This is well argued in the lit rature (Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco; 
2005), and is known as easing the “binding constraints” on growth. 
11. Strong industry associations, independent of the Government, must be supported, for example 
in meat processing. These associations must be allowed to engage directly with the 
Government to discuss their perceptions of the problems facing their sector. The development 
of associations where no strong ones exist may require some public funding. 
12. Mongolian entrepreneurs and SMEs require short- andmedium-term support from the 
Government, in the form of “carrot and stick”. Entrep eneurs willing to take the risks involved 
in setting up a firm must have access to advice and fu s from the Government. The time-
frame for support should be fixed, and continued support should be conditional on good 
performance. Failing this, the entrepreneur would be penalized by terminating the funding. 
The process would require close supervision. Companies trying to initiate activities in both 
traditional industries and new manufacturing activities could benefit from this scheme. 
13. The Government has to support risk-taking activities hat are genuinely new to Mongolia and 
represent a major shift away from current specialization, for which the Government may wish 
to select a priority area. 
14. Improvements in the quality of natural fibres (cashmere, yak hair, sheep’s wool and camel 
hair) are essential to secure a position in internaio l markets. This implies adopting and 
implementing international standards. Improving the quality of natural fibres necessitates the 
informed and active participation of herders.  
15. Specifically, in the cashmere sector, the relationship between herders and processors must be 
strengthened. The advisability of establishing a cashmere commodity exchange, involving 
herders’ associations and processors, should be assessed.  
16. For the meat industry to succeed in international mrkets, attention should be paid to the 
quality of inputs along the meat processing chain. Price differentiation must be implemented 
so that prices are linked to the cuts and quality of meat.  
17. Priority support should be given to manufactured minerals already being exported (SITC 
Rev2: Copper and copper alloys, refined or not, 6821; Copper and copper alloys, worked, 
6822; Aluminium and aluminium alloys, worked, 6842; and Lead and lead alloys, worked, 
6852) or ones close in nature to them, and other products in the SITC 68 category, non-ferrous 
metals. These products are likely to require similar skill sets and institutional knowledge. 
Identifying export markets will be key to this effort. 
Consistent implementation of measures is needed to correct market failures and to promote new 
activities. 
 
18. A wide range of measures to promote the development of manufacturing activities should be 
introduced: tax holidays, Export Processing Zones, labour training subsidies, tax concessions, 
etc. The support should be for broad sectors, without favouring individual sub-sectors. 
Strategic Directions on Industrial Policy in Mongolia  
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Mongolia is a labour-surplus economy and its diversification needs to be built around a strong base of 
local skills. 
 
19. The government should invest in education and technical training, in particular strengthening 
the capacity of the labour force in English language nd ICT skills and in specialist aspects of 
industry like cashmere processing. 
20. Skilled labour is needed for each industry. The country could establish agreements with other 
governments, chambers of industry and commerce, or appropriate companies to train 
personnel in specific tasks. 
Mongolia has to take into consideration the rapidly changing environment to identify what products 
are in greatest demand in the most dynamic markets. 
 
21. The methodology used in this report suggests that Mongolia could produce and export higher-
value textile products, which would be easier than moving to brand new activities.  Higher-
value textiles are “nearby” products in its “product space”, where economic distance is low, 
due to the similarity of the assets and capabilities they require. 
22. The opportunity for Mongolian manufactured products lies in selected niche international 
markets. 
23. The country should consider comparator countries, such as Uruguay and Botswana, which 
have similar characteristics (a relatively large territory and a small population dependent on a 
few commodities and a narrow range of manufactures), as potential models to follow. 
Mongolia can undoubtedly become a more diversified economy than it is now, but the pace of 
diversification will depend on the industrial policies pursued by the government and the 
responsiveness of the private sector to the inducements to invest in new areas of activity. Note 
however that industrial (manufacturing) development is not the only route to diversification. Service 
sector development (including tourism) can be a comple ent to industrialization, but is outside the 
scope of this Report. 
 
Introduction  
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1. Introduction 
Mongolia faces critical policy challenges. Its large mineral reserves give it the potential to grow 
rapidly and raise living standards significantly. However, international experience shows that mineral 
reserves do not guarantee prosperity and that the rents from their exploitation need to be invested 
wisely to ensure that growth can be sustained once they are depleted. There has recently been wide 
coverage in the international media of the high potential growth that the economy could achieve on the 
basis of investment in its mining sector. Indeed, Mongolia is one of the richest countries in the world 
in terms of mineral endowments, and international prices of minerals have been booming. Therefore, 
there are high expectations for mining projects. However, there are also concerns about the economy’s 
capacity to cope with the requirements of these ambitious projects. 
During the mid-1990s Mongolia experienced a radical change in its economic regime. This involved 
the rapid opening-up of the economy to foreign trade nd the privatization of most of the larger 
industrial enterprises. With entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1997 all tariffs were 
eliminated for a two-year period. They were re-imposed at a uniform rate of 5 per cent in 1999, which 
remains the current rate (UNDP, 2008: 16).  
This trade regime has been criticized from different standpoints for causing the very rapid decline of 
the manufacturing sector in the 1990s. One criticism  that, although the old manufacturing sector 
may have been inefficient by world standards, it was a source of jobs, income and industrial expertise 
and that the rapid opening of the domestic market to imports meant that skilled industrial workers were 
driven into low-productivity jobs in the informal sector, such as herding, agriculture or artisanal 
mining (Reinert, 2004). Trade policy has also been criticized for not making full use of the instruments 
allowed by WTO membership to support industry. For example, selected parts of manufacturing could 
have been granted higher rates of protection than te low standard rate, since the bound import tariff 
ceiling at accession to WTO was set at 20 per cent. Nor has the country made use of WTO provisions 
on trade remedies, not applying them to local producers affected by temporary import surges (UNDP, 
2008: 12).  
The main objective of this report is to suggest direct ons for industrial policy to the Government of 
Mongolia, with the aim of diversifying into higher value-added industrial activities. The report is 
based on rigorous research assessing the performance of Mongolia’s most important sectors: minerals, 
natural fibres and meat processing as well as suggetin  new areas of comparative advantage. It 
summarizes the findings of two workshops which took place in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (on 24-25 
February 2010 and 3-4 June 2010), at which Mongolian officials, UNIDO officials, international 
experts, entrepreneurs, academics and representativs of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
discussed industrial policy issues. 
The report contains five chapters. The first chapter briefly introduces the topic of industrialization i  
Mongolia and raises concerns about the ability of the economy to cope with ambitious new projects.  
The second chapter discusses the recent economic performance of Mongolia and its manufacturing 
sector. It considers the role of industrial policy in the development of new sectors of the economy that 
would allow the country to achieve a more sustainable long-term economic performance which is not 
wholly dependent on minerals. A recently proposed methodology which involves the construction of 
two indices, PRODY and EXPY, developed by Harvard economists (among them Ricardo Hausmann, 
Jason Hwang and Dani Rodrik), is followed. The methodology quantifies a country’s position in the 
value added chain. In the case of Mongolia it transpire  that its export basket has remained very 
Introduction  
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concentrated over time and its export structure is producing lower value- added products than other 
countries at comparable levels of income.  
The next three chapters are studies of sectors which are of relevance for Mongolia because of their 
current economic contribution and their potential. The sectors are mining, natural fibres and red-meat 
processing. The possibility of processing some of the raw materials produced in the mining sector is 
explored in Chapter 3. However, it is argued that it cannot be assumed that mineral processing is 
economically viable. This applies to both copper smelting and coal cleaning as well as to a range of 
metallurgical activities. In the short run the country should continue to extract and export mineral 
products. Any decision about processing minerals can be taken only after detailed profitability 
analyses have been done. 
In Chapter 4 the current characteristics of the natural fibres industry are examined. If Mongolian 
natural fibre products are to access international markets, the first step is to improve the quality of the 
raw material. Once the quality of the fibre is guaranteed, design, production and marketing of 
garments have to be addressed. Mongolia should identify a d target niche markets.  
Chapter 5 addresses the upgrading of the red-meat industry. It discusses its current situation and 
suggests the changes that need to be made in its organization, the management of animals on farms 
and the processing system. It emphasizes that the Mongolian meat industry needs to become 
“consumer-focused” rather than being almost entirely “production-focused” as it is at present. Two of 
the main recommendations are the implementation of a price differentiation system in relation to the 
cuts and quality of the meat and the establishment of producer associations in which the private sector 
should be represented. The establishment of a Mongolia  Meat Industry Board (MMIB) and a 
Mongolian Meat Administrative Body (MMAB) are recommended. 
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2. Challenges for Industrial Development in 
 Mongolia 
2.1 The Recent Performance of the Manufacturing Sector 
Mongolia has a number of highly distinctive features because of its geography and history. The large, 
and in many parts inaccessible, land area and small population give it an extremely high land/labour 
ratio and make transport costs a relatively significant element in manufacturing costs. In addition, its 
land-locked location presents major barriers to foreign trade. Transport costs are high even by the 
standards of other Central Asian land-locked economies, due to the difficulties in modernizing the rail
network because of the cost of upgrading so many tracks. These high transport costs provide natural 
protection for producers selling in the small domestic market, but at the same time make it more 
difficult to export, particularly goods with low value-to-weight ratios. Several non-geographic 
problems have also been highlighted in recent reports, including a shortage of long-term credit because 
of a poorly functioning financial system, a weak investment climate with corruption and non-
transparency as particularly serious issues, and a shortage of skills including low levels of competenc  
in the English language (UNIDO, 2002; World Bank, 2007a; UNDP 2008). In addition, Mongolia has 
serious deficiencies in infrastructure with its road, rail, power and air links classed by observers as 
among the very worst in Asia.1 
Manufacturing output in 2001 was roughly 40 per cent of its value in 1990.2 Since then there has been 
a modest recovery in manufacturing but the sector accounts for only a very small share of total 
activity, currently less than 5 per cent of GDP. Table 1 gives growth rates for manufacturing and its 
share in GDP at constant prices over the period 1996-2008. Annual figures are erratic with the initial 
revival of activity in 2001-02 driven by the substanti l expansion of clothing exports after the United 
States of America granted Mongolia full most favoured nation (MFN) treatment in 1999. Foreign 
investors (principally from China, Hong Kong Special Administration Region of China, Taiwan 
Province of China and the Republic of Korea) dominated the industry, establishing production 
facilities as a means of avoiding quotas in the United States. The ending of the import quota system in 
2005 meant that Mongolian garments were unable to compete in the United States market and, after 
stabilizing in 2004, export sales fell significantly in 2005-06, so that by 2007 they were slightly below 
the level of ten years earlier (UNDP, 2008: 96-99). This slowdown, and then slump, in the garment 
sector was the major factor behind the 20 per cent d cline in manufacturing in 2005. 
                                                   
1 McCawley (2010). Table 3 shows the ranking of countries in Asia based on expert judgements on the quality of 
infrastructure. Mongolia comes bottom out of 21 countries in the overall index. 
2 This is derived from the statistics on manufacturing growth at constant prices in UNIDO (2002), Table 2.1. An 
average annual rate of decline of manufacturing value- dded of 9.7 per cent over the 1990s is given for Mongolia 
in the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2007b, Appendix Table 4.1). 
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Table 1. Manufacturing growth and GDP share, 1996-2008 
Year 
Manufacturing growth at 
constant prices % 
GDP growth at constant 
prices % 
Manufacturing share in 
GDP % 
1996 -14.6 2.3 8.4 
1997 -13.8 4.0 6.9 
1998 3.5 3.5 6.9 
1999 -3.0 3.2 6.5 
2000 -3.2 1.1 6.2 
2001 33.0 9.4 8.2 
2002 18.8 3.8 9.4 
2003 n.a. n.a. 5.6 
2004 -3.7 10.6 4.9 
2005 -19.4 7.2 3.7 
2006 13.3 8.6 3.8 
2007 28.8 10.2 4.5 
2008 4.5 8.8 4.3 
Note: n. a. is not available since the constant price series changes in 2003 and the values for 2002 and 2003 are 
not in comparable prices. 
Source: National Statistics Office (NSO) Yearbook of Statistics and ADB website (www.adb.org), Mongolia 
section. 
Since 1990 there has been a considerable fall in the share in manufacturing of the consumer goods 
sub-sectors of garments, leather and footwear and in the capital- and scale-intensive activities of 
chemicals and non-metallic minerals. The result has been a concentration on a limited range of 
manufactures, principally textiles, food products and basic metals, which together represented nearly 
80 per cent of all manufacturing in 2008 (see Table 2). These industries draw on the natural resources 
of the economy such as livestock, wool and ore-based m tal processing. The vast majority of 
manufacturing (97.5 per cent of value added in 2005) has been classified as producing either resource-
based or low-technology goods rather than medium- and high-technology goods.3 
Mongolia has plentiful endowments of minerals, and there are ambitious plans to expand the 
exploitation of these deposits. In the late 1990s mining represented around 12 per cent of GDP, but 
growing mining activity, combined with higher commodity prices, has meant that it has become an 
increasingly important activity, accounting for betw en 60 and 70 per cent of industrial output and 
between 18 and 21 per cent of GDP in the period 2005-2008. Minerals have also come to dominate 
exports, with mineral products accounting for 67 per c nt of export value in 2007 and 60 per cent in 
2008 (NSO, 2009). The key policy challenge for Monglia is to use its mineral revenues to revitalize 
and modernize manufacturing and to diversify the economy more generally to allow it to reach a more 
stable growth path. 
                                                   
3 See UNIDO (2009) Annex 11, Table1. This source gives the classification used by ISIC category. 
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Table 2.  Composition of manufacturing in 2008 (at 2005 constant prices) 
Category Millions of tog % composition 
Food and beverages 186,476 32.4 
Tobacco 23,444 4.1 
Textiles 130,034 22.6 
Wearing apparel 17,355 3.0 
Publishing and printing 13,599 2.4 
Chemicals 6,036 1.0 
Non-metallic minerals 27,586 4.8 
Basic metals 135,739 23.6 
Transport equipment  16,447 2.9 
Others 18,316 3.2 
Total 575,032 100 
Source: National Statistics Office (NSO) Yearbook of Statistics 2009. 
Table 3 summarizes employment data by the aggregate categories of agriculture, industry and others, 
with the industry category covering mining, manufacturing and utilities. Total industrial employment 
in 2008 at around 124,000 was 12 per cent of the employed workforce and is still below the 1990 
level, although it has been growing at around 4 per cent annually since 2000. The implied employment 
elasticity with respect to output of 0.19 is relatively low by international standards and reflects the
dominance of mining, which is a relatively capital-intensive activity within the industrial sector. 
Employment data are particularly unreliable in much of Asia but this elasticity for industry is lower 
than reported for all but one other Asian economy in a recent comparative study (Felipe et al., 2007: 
Table 2).  
Within industry, employment in manufacturing is estimated at around 41,000 in 2007, which is a 
modest increase over the figure of 38,000 for 2000, but nonetheless still only equal to the 1992 
employment level. Within manufacturing, the main employers are garments (approximately 10,000 
workers in 2007), food and beverages (also around 10,000 workers) and textiles (around 5,000 
workers).  While the garments industry is still an important employer, in 2007 its workforce was well 
below the peak of nearly 17,000 in 2003, as a result of the decline in clothing exports stemming from 
the ending of the MFA quota system. 
Table 3. Mongolia’s employment structure  






Agriculture  258.8 354.2 393.5 377.6 -0.5 
Industry 131.6 108.1 91 124.1 3.9 
Others 393.2 305.3 324.5 540.0 6.6 
 
Distribution (% of total) 
Employment 
elasticity 
Agriculture 0.33 0.46 0.48 0.36 -0.04 
Industry 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.19 
Others 0.50 0.40 0.40 0.52 0.37 
Notes: Annual growth is a logarithmic growth rate. Employment elasticity is employment growth divided by 
growth of sector. 
Source: Asian Development Bank (www.adb.org), Mongolia section. 
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2.2 The Dynamics of the Manufacturing Sector 
The declining share of manufacturing in GDP in Monglia is cause for concern because there is a 
significant body of theory, backed up by empirical evidence, which suggests that different sectors have 
different growth effects and that at relatively low levels of income in particular the absolute and 
relative growth of manufacturing can have a key role in overall economic development.  
The case for manufacturing as an ‘engine of growth’ is based on its capacity to generate productivity 
growth, technical change and externalities operating hrough the links between independent firms. 
Different mechanisms have been stressed by different authors but central is the view that, unlike other 
sectors, manufacturing generates ‘dynamic increasing returns’; that is raising productivity through the 
expansion of production, through learning and through increased specialization.  In this process 
increasing returns are the result both of the cumulative expansion of production and of interaction 
between activities, and are not simply confined to conventional economies of scale within activities. 
This dynamic process is in contrast to agriculture and services, where productivity growth arises 
through labour-saving technical change and the moveent of workers off the land and to parts of the 
services sector, where productivity responds passively to expansion in other sectors.4  Early 
development theory underestimated the potential for new branches of services (particularly those 
linked with computer-based technology) to generate sustained productivity growth and behave in the 
same way as manufacturing. Such dynamic services are, however, rarely significant in a low-income 
context.  
Innovation and the resulting technical change play a critical role in economic growth, and whilst 
manufacturing may not be the only activity where thy occur, when they are more prevalent in 
manufacturing, this provides a justification for its special place in planning for growth.5 If increasing 
returns and externalities are the rationale for intervention, logically this implies selectivity in support, 
since the scope for these effects will vary both betwe n branches and between firms within branches. 
These theoretical arguments on the special role for manufacturing are supported empirically by the 
following broad generalizations (Rodrik, 2006): 
i) As countries grow up to a threshold income level th s are of manufacturing in GDP rises.  
The generalization that up to certain point the share of manufacturing in national income rises as 
income per capita grows up is well-established and has been re-confirmed in recent analyses (UNIDO, 
2009; ADB, 2007). If one plots the relationship, it is best represented as a U shaped curve with the 
share of manufacturing rising at an increasing rateat relatively low income levels (as in the newly 
industrializing countries –the NICs), stabilizing at some point and then declining beyond that. The 
strength of the initial impulse comes from a move out of agriculture into higher productivity activities, 
of which manufacturing is the key. Workers also move ut of agriculture into services, and the service 
sector’s share in GDP also increases. Two economic factors will drive this process. On the demand 
side it is well-established that the share of income spent on food declines as income rises, whilst the 
expenditure share on manufactures rises with income. However, as income passes a threshold level, 
the expenditure share of manufactures stabilizes and then starts to decline. The second factor 
influencing this process of successive sectoral shifts is differential productivity growth. Historically 
there is strong evidence that growth of labour productivity in manufacturing is more rapid than in 
                                                   
4 This analysis stems from the influential work of Nicholas Kaldor in the 1960s. Various surveys and summaries 
are available. See, for example, Weiss (2002) Chapter 4. 
5 The ‘self discovery’ model of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) sets out the case for subsidising innovative and 
risk-taking activity in the introduction of new products and technologies as all potential followers gain from the 
actions of innovators.  
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agriculture or in services, although there is some evidence that newer computer-based service 
activities are also seeing rapid increases in productivity.6 Faster productivity growth means that the 
price of manufactures relative to services declines, boosting the initial demand shift towards 
manufactures. At a later stage this favourable relativ  price shift creates a substitution effect in favour 
of manufactures, which partly offsets the effect of a declining income elasticity of demand for 
manufactures.  
ii)  Up to a threshold income per capita, fast growth of GDP is associated with a large 
manufacturing share.  
Manufacturing is not the only sector whose share is correlated with GDP growth but for the theoretical 
reasons noted above the impact of its size on growth tends to be greater than for services (Szirmai, 
2009; Dasgupta and Singh, 2006). Furthermore, analyses of periods of rapid growth (‘growth 
accelerations’) suggest that rapid growth tends to be either accompanied or preceded by a structural 
shift in either output or employment  towards manufcturing. An analysis for developing Asia finds 
that for periods of ‘rapid growth’ (defined as more than three consecutive period averages of growth in 
GDP of at least 5 per cent) there is a statistically significant tendency for these to be associated with a 
rising manufacturing share, but no similar conclusion is reached for services. This is in part because  
rise in services share can also be associated with a growth deceleration as workers displaced elsewhere 
are absorbed in services activity with lower productivity (ADB, 2007: 297- 303).  
It should be noted, however, that some new service activities are showing signs of dynamism similar 
to that of manufacturing. Whilst some service activities in developing countries, such as retail and 
wholesale trade and public bureaucracies, have low productivity, new dynamic elements of services 
are emerging, such as business and computer-based service , telecommunications and tourism. In 
some countries (e.g. India) these latter dynamic elem nts are starting to dominate and the services 
sector as a whole is behaving in a way similar to manufacturing and thus offering higher-productivity 
employment than that available in agriculture. It appears that booms and busts in mining can also be 
responsible for faster and slower growth in mineral-dependent countries. 
iii)  Economies that have higher value exports based on manufactures tend to have both higher export 
and GDP growth. 
The historical and contemporary evidence shows that what a country exports matters for growth. 
Recent work by Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2006) attempts to quantify the diversification of the 
export basket of individual countries by constructing commodity indices of technological or product 
sophistication (see Box 1). This is done by using a weighted average of the income of the exporters of 
a good to the world market, which is called PRODY (at either the 4- or 6-digit level). The PRODYs 
are then aggregated into a single export index for each country which is called EXPY (a higher EXPY 
implies a higher value-added composition of exports). This becomes one of the explanatory variables 
in a model to explain growth. The result is that for l wer and middle income economies (but not 
higher income countries) there is a significant positive relation between the EXPY index at the start of 
a period and subsequent growth, controlling for other influences.  The impact of EXPY on growth 
varies with the form of estimation, but it is in the range of 0.3 to 0.8 percentage points of extra GDP 
growth for every 10 per cent increase in the index.  The result is confirmed in a separate analysis for 
developing Asia using the same approach (see Box 2). Exporting high-value goods is thus good for 
growth, and since most high-value products are manufactures, this measure provides a new link 
between export composition and growth. It is picking up the high income elasticity of demand of high 
                                                   
6For example, in the OECD countries, between 1971 and 1994, the growth of labour productivity in 
manufacturing (at 3% annually) was nearly three times that of productivity growth in services (at 1.1%) 
(Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997, Table 1).   
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value-added products. Rodrik (2006) looks specifically t the case of China, whose EXPY is well 
above that predicted for its income level and which appears to explain at least part of China’s high 
growth rate.  
Box 1. PRODY and EXPY methodology 
 
The structure of production and structure of exports matters for the growth of output and exports. 
One way of showing this, pioneered by Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2006) is to calculate the 
EXPY for each country based on whether countries ar specializing in ‘high income’ goods or 




Y j is the per capita GDP of country j 
xkj denotes exports of country j of product k 




xkj denotes exports of product k of country j  
Xj denotes total exports of country j 
Some developing countries such as China have an EXPY higher than would be expected on the basis 
of their level of per capita income, indicating they are producing and exporting types of 
(manufactured) goods more associated with higher income countries. 
A relationship between EXPY and export growth reflects the higher income elasticity of demand for 
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Box 2. Export sophistication and economic growth 
 
The simplest version of the model of Hausmann et al. (2006) makes growth over a specific 
time period (g) a function of the starting level of GDP per capita (Y), the starting level of 
export sophistication as measured by the EXPY index and the changing share of industry in 
national income over the period (dM).  
g  =  a   + b1 Y  +  b2 EXPY +  b3 dM 
The expectation is that other things held constant growth will be slower the higher is initial 
GDP per capita (so b1 is negative).  The rising share of industry in GDP is expected to be 
positively associated with growth up to a threshold income level. The test is whether the type 
of goods a country exports at the start of the period is associated with subsequent growth (so 
b2 is expected to be positive).  
This analysis is conducted for 23 countries in developing Asia over the period 1977-2004 
both on a cross sectional basis over the whole period and using five year averages in an 
unbalanced panel analysis. The results given below c nfirm the Hausmann et  al. (2006) 
conclusions. 
Cross section n = 23 
g =  -0.011 Y   +    0.056 EXPY   +  0.001 M                                     R2  =  0.35   
         (1.89)*                (2.85)**           (0.50) 
Five year panel n = 61 
g =      -0.005Y   +  0.032 EXPY    +  0.007M                                    R2  =  0.30 
             (-2.48)**      (5.01)***              (5.43)*** 
The coefficient on EXPY is positive and significant and implies that a 10% increase in the 
sophistication score means that growth over the period is raised by between 0.3 and 0.6 
percentage points, as compared to 0.3 and 0.8 in the analysis of Hausmann et al.  (2006). 
Notes: The variables g, Y and EXPY are in logarithms; t ratios are in brackets; *** significant at 1%; 
** significant at 5%; and, * significant at 10%.  
Source: ADB (2007: 295). 
If manufacturing has a role in growth, what can be said about the sector in Mongolia? Has it become 
too small relative to the rest of the economy? One way of addressing this question is to benchmark 
Mongolia against countries of similar income level and other characteristics and to consider whether 
the size of the sector is higher or lower than expected for a country at that income level and with those 
characteristics. Box 3 describes this exercise, the result of which suggests that manufacturing in 
Mongolia is indeed smaller than expected. 
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Box 3. Mongolia and cross-country patterns for manufacturing 
 
To examine how Mongolia’s economic structure differs f om what would be expected the 
analysis uses a simple cross-country regression model that makes the manufacturing share in 
GDP (M) a function of income per capita (Y), population (P) and a dummy variable for whether 
or not a country is a significant mineral exporter (D).  The form of the equation is: 
M  = a +  b1Y  + b2Y
2  + b3P  + b4D             (1)  
Different income measures both unadjusted and purchasing power parity values are tried with 
very similar results. Data relate to 2005-06 and the model is run for 94 countries at different 
income levels. Following the index developed by Davis (1995) the dummy D takes a value of 1 
for economies identified as mineral-dependent (plus Mongolia as a recent large scale mineral 
exporter) and a zero for all others.  The squared income term is introduced to allow for the S-
shaped relation where the manufacturing share declines beyond a certain income level. Thus 
whilst the coefficient b1 is expected to be positive, b2 is expected to be negative. Other things 
being equal, a large domestic market, as reflected by population size, will be expected to 
increase manufacturing share (b3 is expected to be positive). However, mineral exporters, other 
things being equal, will be expected to have a smaller manufacturing share (b4 is expected to be 
negative). 
Data come from UNIDO (2009) for manufacturing share, and the World Development 
Indicators for population and income data. The result when (1) is estimated in logarithmic form 
is given below with all variables strongly significant and with the expected signs. 
Manufacturing share in GDP rises with income up to a threshold and then declines.  A larger 
population is associated with a larger manufacturing share and mineral-dependent economies 
have a smaller manufacturing share. 
M  = -6.06  +  1.88 lnY – 0.99 lnY2  +  0.06 lnP – 0.36 D 
         (-2.96)*   (2.82)*      (-3.64)*         (2.32)**   (-3.55)*  Adjusted R2  = 0.31;  N = 94 
Putting the income and population values for Mongolia into this equation predicts a 
manufacturing share in GDP of 9.6%, which is more than double the actual share for 2008 (see 
Table 1).  
In addition to a lower than predicted manufacturing share in GDP, Mongolia also has a lower 
than predicted export sophistication. EXPY can be related to GDP with the expectation that as 
countries get richer their export basket gets more sophisticated in terms of higher-value 
products. Mineral-exporting countries may behave differently and this needs to be controlled. A 
simple regression is run across 94 countries for which data are available where 
EXPY = a  +  b1Y  + D             (2) 
where, as before, Y is GDP per capita and D is the mineral dependent-economy dummy. 
The result of equation (2) is: 
EXPY =  9,472   +  0.21Y   +  426D 
                 (22.73)*   (10.35)*       (0.64)   Adjusted R2 = 0.54; N = 94 
If the income value for Mongolia in 2006 is applied to this equation, it gives an expected EXPY 
of US$10,547. This can be compared with the actual EXPY in 2006 of US$7,302. Thus the 
actual level is approximately 70 per cent of that predicted. 
Note: t-ratios in brackets, * significant at 1 per c nt level, ** significant at 5 per cent level. 
Source: Weiss (2010). 
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2.3 The Role of Government in Supporting Manufacturing Industry 
Industrial policy takes the form of policy interventions designed to affect the allocation of resources in 
favour of industry (principally manufacturing) as di tinct from other sectors. Such interventions may 
also affect resource allocation within industry in favour of particular branches or sub-sectors (so they
may be ‘selective’ rather than ‘functional’). Interv ntions can involve either the price mechanism or 
direct controls and be focused on exports as well as the domestic market. Industrial policy in this 
definition is thus much wider than the import substitution trade policies with which it is often 
associated. It can also be seen as a process as well as a set of interventions in which dialogue betwen 
government and the productive sector identifies the key constraints that policy needs to address.  
The theoretical basis for industrial policy focuses on two propositions, one relating to the special role 
for manufacturing and the other to the failure of markets to produce a social optimum because of 
factors like externalities, lack of information, monopolization or social barriers. The early 
development literature contained analyses of how market failures could be overcome by government 
intervention: by co-ordinating investments to overcome demand constraints (the Big Push/Balanced 
Growth argument); by encouraging the absorption of the labour surplus in manufacturing; and by 
fostering learning-by-doing (through infant industry protection). In the face of widespread market 
failure, subsidies as compensation were treated as the most efficient (but not necessarily the most 
practical) solution. The rationale for interventions based on general market failure logically implies 
that support should be offered equally to all participants in the market (‘functional’ support). However, 
insofar as increasing returns and externalities provide the rationale for intervention, this implies 
selectivity in support, since the scope for these eff cts will vary both between sub-sectors or branches 
of manufacturing and between firms in branches.  Given the focus on externalities, industrial policy 
must also have an environmental dimension to ensure appropriate standards. Tax-subsidy measures 
can also be applied to correct for environmental externalities. In brief, there is no shortage of 
arguments that can be marshalled to make a case for industrial policy.  
Although there may be widespread agreement that governments have a role in industrial development 
beyond simply ensuring a stable macro environment and protecting property rights, there remain large 
differences over what is an appropriate and feasible role. This is not surprising since the challenges 
and governments’ capacity to intervene differ betwen countries, and what is necessary and feasible in 
the context of a middle-income or newly- industrializing economy can be quite different from what is 
necessary and feasible in the context of a low-income economy like Mongolia.7 
Objections relate to feasibility and the possibility of policy ‘capture’ by vested interests. The debat  
about industrial policy can be summarized by focusing on two competing perspectives. One can be 
characterized as a promotional approach. In this, governments are recommended to think big, and to 
support and promote sub-sectors. The aim is to shift fa rly rapidly into new, dynamic and 
technologically-sophisticated activities. Some of these may be quite different from the sectors the 
economy is currently specializing in. Since by definition some will be new activities for the economy, 
firms may need financial incentives to justify the risk involved. Governments are perceived as 
promoters, which act as catalysts and provide the financial support needed during the learning period 
of the new firms and assist in the process of industrial start-up with training, export marketing and the 
general co-ordination of support activities. The other perspective, which can be characterized as a 
market-based approach, sees governments as facilitators whose role is to address the malfunctioning of 
                                                   
7 The debate between Lin and Chang (Lin and Chang, 2009) illustrates some of the key differences. Lin talks of a 
facilitating state that supports activities with a comparative advantage and Chang of a more interventionist state 
that funds technological upgrading. 
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markets, either to correct for externalities or to pr vide the information and infrastructure needed by 
firms. Although this role may seem to imply a more modest amount of intervention, the role of the 
government can be substantial when governments interpret market failure in a broad sense, for 
example providing credit where the financial sector is risk averse, or training where firms under-invest 
because of the risk of workers leaving. The facilitating government corrects for failures, leaving firms 
to decide how far they wish to innovate and upgrade their production.   
The most recent academic interpretation of industrial policy as developed by a team at Harvard 
University has been applied to a number of countries and draws on both perspectives. Of the countries 
studied, the work on South Africa as a major mineral xporter is most directly relevant to Mongolia. In 
their analysis of the policy options for South Africa, Hausmann et al. (2008a) argue that industrial 
policy should work on two levels. On the micro level (what they term ‘in the small’), there should be 
regular dialogue between the government and the private sector where bottlenecks and market failures 
are identified, and the government plays a co-ordinating and facilitating role to remove them. On the 
second level (‘in the large’) a more ambitious role is identified for government, providing funds in the 
form of risk capital for innovative ventures through a Public Venture Capital Fund or a Development 
Bank. The aim is to support risk–taking activities that are genuinely new to a country and represent a 
major shift away from current specialization. The rationale for public support is that risk-takers who 
innovate open a path for others to follow and thus offer a form of external benefit for which they are 
not compensated. Thus, in the absence of public support, there will be too little risk-taking and 
innovation.  Since a lack of funds for new activities can be interpreted as credit-market failure, this is 
compatible with the market-based perspective. However, aspects of the recommendations contained in 
Hausmann et al. suggest elements of a promotional approach where t  government may wish to select 
a priority area and then look for and support private investors in its development. Since the support 
that can be offered will be limited, either explicitly or implicitly, governments will in practice be 
favouring some areas over others.8  
What sort of intervention is likely to be implied by the different versions of industrial policy under the 
broad definition used here? The objective of industrial policy is to increase incentives for industry and 
to raise the rate of profit there. This can be achieved in a variety of ways aimed at addressing 
particular problems. Table 4 sets out a simple taxonomy distinguishing between the ‘market-based’ 
and ‘promotional’ approaches, where the former aim to correct for market failures as they affect 
existing activities and the latter to promote or create new activities with the potential for productivity 
growth and externalities (or to restructure activities with potential). ‘Functional’ means widely 
available as opposed to ‘selective’, which refers to favoured activities or firms.  
                                                   
8 Hausmann and Rodrik (2006) describe this dilemma dramatically as being ‘doomed to choose’. 
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Table 4. Industrial policy taxonomy 
Market-based measures Coverage Rationale 
Research and Development tax credits  Functional Technology spill-overs and risk-taking externalities 
State industrial research and education  Functional Creation of national technological capability  
Labour training subsidy Functional Labour training externality  
State venture-capital funds Selective Risk-taking externality 
State export-promotion agency  Functional Lack of information and provision of  a public good 
Infrastructure provision for Special 
Economic Zones 
Functional 
Encouragement of clustering and agglomeration 
effects 
Profits tax holidays  Functional Encouragement of manufacturing investment  
Undervaluation of exchange rate  Functional 
Encouragement of internationally-traded activities, 
including manufacturing   
Promotional measures Coverage Rationale 
Temporary financial assistance  Selective 
Funding to allow restructuring of uncompetitive 
activities 
Temporary import tariff protection  Selective 
Protection of uncompetitive activities requiring 
restructuring 
State procurement policy  Selective Priority in access to public-sector contracts 
Export subsidy Selective 
Differential rates of subsidy based on productivity 
potential 
Import tariffs   Selective 
Differential rates of protection based on productivity 
potential  
Directed credit  Selective 
Priority allocation of credit based on productivity 
potential 
Profits tax holidays (selective) Selective Favourable tax treatment for foreign investors 
Incentive packages of tax, loans and 
infrastructure  
Selective Favourable treatment for foreign investors 
Source: Weiss (2010, Table 4). 
Each measure has its advantages and disadvantages.  Government expenditure on infrastructure 
provision, for example, may lower production and transport costs and boost the incentive to invest in 
industry. However, it has to be financed, and thus places strong demands on fiscal policy.  Tax 
concessions of various types do not involve direct expenditure, but only benefit firms after investment 
decisions have been made. The availability of credit will be important to investors where the 
commercial banking system is not playing its financi l intermediation role effectively, but where 
domestic savings are insufficient, external funds will have to be found. How far credit should be 
available at a concessional or subsidized interest rate is highly controversial. Low-interest loans raise 
the incentive to invest, but run the risk of encouraging low-return activities, since investors do not
need to cover the opportunity cost of the funds.  In addition, such loans may, if used widely, shift the
choice of technology in a capital-intensive, labour-saving direction. Import protection has the great 
attraction of not requiring additional revenue, since support for investors is provided by domestic 
consumers of the protected goods, and also raises tax revenue.  
International experience, and particularly the experience of East Asia, suggests that the precise mix of 
instruments used is less important than the pursuit of several broad principles to ensure that these lead 
to genuine industrial development as opposed to simply increasing the profits of the recipients (Weiss, 
2005). These can be summarized as follows: 
• A regular dialogue with the private sector; 
Challenges for Industrial Developments in Mongolia  
© United Nations Industrial Development Organization 2011 28 
• Clear performance criteria should be established so the success or otherwise of an intervention 
can be judged; and it should be made clear where gov rnment support is being directed. 
Support should be time-limited, not open-ended, so recipients have an incentive to improve 
efficiency by the end of the period specified; 
• As far as possible support should be provided for br ad activities (such as R and D or labour 
training) or sectors (like electronics) rather than to individual firms, to avoid distorting 
competition and establishing monopolies9; 
•  Exporting should be encouraged as a means of introducing competition and opening a sector 
to foreign technology and to earn foreign exchange. 
2.4 Industrial Policy in Mongolia 
For the reasons highlighted earlier, Mongolia is under-industrialized. Economic diversification that 
allows the manufacturing sector to play a more significant role should be an important policy 
objective. As to how this might be achieved, there are three broad options, not mutually exclusive. 
• Development of the mineral sector; 
• Modernization of traditional activities; and  
• Development of new activities. 
How far these are viable options will depend not so much on financial resources, since rising mineral 
revenues will be expected to provide significant funding for diversification, as on the skill level, 
infrastructure and institutional basis of the country, which will determine its absorptive capacity. 
Government policy clearly has a role to play in increasing absorptive capacity. Various aspects of 
policy are discussed below. 
Mongolia is currently operating an export-oriented in ustrialization strategy in the context of an open 
trade regime. Given the small size of the domestic market, evidence that one of the prerequisites of 
success with such a strategy is that producers should access imported inputs at international prices, and 
the existence of significant natural protection from the landlocked nature of the economy, it is unlikely 
that low uniform protection has seriously undermined domestic manufacturing. Moreover, an open 
trading regime is compatible with various forms of support for domestic producers with the 
qualification that such support is not ‘trade-distorting’, so that it does not involve one of the various 
forms of export subsidy or minimum local content targets. Examples of such support include the 
provision of finance to industry or tax holidays for industrial investment, where firms themselves are 
allowed to determine whether and how much of their production is exported and how much they 
purchase from domestic suppliers.   
                                                   
9 There is some dispute as to whether sector targeting is sensible, with some preferring to stress support to 
activities that generate externalities and may span everal sectors; see Hausmann and Rodrik (2005: 79). 
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The current formal policy for industry of the Government of Mongolia, as set out in the Millennium 
Development Goals-Based Comprehensive National Developm nt Strategy of Mongolia, was approved 
in February 2008. This document contains highly ambitious annual growth targets for GDP of 14 per 
cent over 2008-15 and of 12 per cent annually from 2016-2021, to allow the economy to achieve 
middle-income status by the end of the period. These figures are high even by the standards of the 
recent past when mineral prices were very favourable. Even allowing for the development of the many 
mineral projects planned over this period, such rapid growth is almost certainly unattainable, since 
even with the revival of favourable commodity prices, the absorptive capacity of the economy would 
be limited by factors such as lack of skilled personnel and infrastructure capacity.  
The core of this strategy is to use mineral wealth to generate resources to allow the diversification of 
the economy. It is clear that the government is well-aware of the industrial policy options available to 
it, and the strategy document identifies many of the policy interventions set out in Table 4.  
 
Table 5. Mongolia Millennium Development Goals-Based Comprehensive National Development 
Strategy: key industrial policy interventions 
Objective Mechanisms Instruments 
Develop the mineral sector 
Exploit mineral deposits and 
encourage processing to add 
value (p. 27) 
Negotiated contracts with foreign investors 
based on length of lease, royalty and tax 
rates; develop supplier firms for mining 
sector (p. 29) 
Modernize manufacturing  
Introduce new technologies in 
traditional sectors  
Incentive packages for domestic and 
foreign investors; Free Economic Zones 
(p. 25); training programmes to upgrade 
skills (p. 25); develop ICT (p. 39) 
Develop national technologies  
Support a national innovation 
system  (p. 17) 
Tax incentives for R and D (p. 25); 
Finance through Mongolia Development 
Fund (p. 17); Public National Research 
Centres (p. 17) 
Manage foreign trade  
Diversify exports with 
‘selected import substitution’ 
(p. 26) 
Macro stability and competitive exchange 
rate (p. 23); support for SME exporters 
through tax policy (import duty drawbacks 
for exporters) (p. 30) 
Increase long-term finance 
Put mineral revenues in 
Mongolia Development Fund 
(p. 21)  
State-owned Development Bank (p.23); 
reduced interest rates for on-lent  foreign 
funds for SMEs (p. 24) 
Improve investment climate 
Support the private sector and 
improve infrastructure 
Regular dialogue with private-sector 
organisations  (p. 26); efficient public 
services, strengthen legal system (p. 27 ); 
develop road and rail networks (pp. 35-36) 
Source: Government of  Mongolia (2008b).  
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The government sees its role as creating a favourable business environment, ensuring a sound and 
reliable financial system and reducing bureaucratic obstacles to doing business. Among its key 
priorities is the development of an export-oriented, private-sector-led, high-technology-driven 
manufacturing sector funded in part out of the proceeds of mineral exploitation (through a Mongolia 
Development Fund). Table 5 summarizes the key objectives, the mechanisms to reach them, and the 
policy instruments referred to in the Millennium Development Goals-Based Comprehensive National 
Development Strategy as they relate to industry. This is a comprehensive list and clearly indicates that
most conventional policy measures are already under discussion in Mongolia. Specifically, key 
concerns highlighted in recent reports on industrial development in Mongolia, such as a lack of long-
term finance, high trade and transport costs, and a deficient investment climate, are all referred to here. 
An important aspect of the process side of industrial policy as highlighted in the recent academic 
literature relates to government intervention to overcome the malfunctioning of markets because of 
lack of information and any divergence between private and social returns. Where markets do not give 
the right signals it is necessary for governments to in ervene to co-ordinate the responses of market 
participants to try to ensure that bottlenecks are ov rcome. Another aspect of co-ordination failure 
relates to the inability to control the impact of productive activity on the environment. The National 
Development Strategy has among its strategic objectives a ‘proper use of land and mineral resources’ 
(p. 44) and in particular the establishment of a system of economic charging for environmental damage 
from mining (p. 28). An effective environmental dimension to industrial policy requires rigorous 
environmental impact assessment studies of new large-scale mines, the effective implementation of 
existing laws and controls, and their extension to the informal sector. 
2.4.1 Long-Term Finance 
The World Bank (2007a: 14) concluded that poor financi l intermediation was the key factor in 
keeping the cost of capital high in Mongolia. Poor c porate governance and lack of transparency in 
business operations are said to have made it difficult for banks to assess credit risk and forced them to 
rely on collateral-based lending with high risk-premiums, particularly for SMEs. Of the total credit to 
the private sector available in the first half of 2008, less than 10 per cent was for loans of over fou  
years, with over 40 per cent for less than one year. Even this relatively low share of long-term 
financing is still a significant improvement over just a few years ago. In 2005 the share of loans of 
over four years was just 4 per cent (ADB, 2009: 33).
Table 6. Mongolia: interest rates (%) 
Year 
Local currency short- 
term borrowing 





2001 41.4 22.2 39.0 8.0 
2002 33.4 19.8 27.4 1.6 
2003 31.5 19.6 25.5 4.7 
2004 30.0 17.9 24.0 11.0 
2005 28.3 14.8 22.3 9.5 
2006 24.5 15.5 16.9 6.0 
2007 19.9 14.2 12.3 15.1 
2008b 20.8 13.8 18.4 17.9 
Note: a Maximum difference lending minus deposit rate; b First quarter only.  
Source: Bank of Mongolia cited in ADB (2009: Table 1.5). 
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Interest rates in Mongolia are high by international st ndards and competitor governments provide 
credit at lower rates (and sometimes grants) to their producers; for example, through modernization 
programmes for leather goods in India and cashmere in China (ADB, 2009: 28). Table 6 gives annual 
average rates for local and foreign currency borrowing and the average lending-deposit rate spread. 
Until 2006 real rates were very high for local currency funding, although since then they have been 
reduced by inflation.  
The underlying cause of the high cost of borrowing in Mongolia has been put down to a combination 
of high deposit rates, high bank operating costs and  reserve ratios, and high risk premiums (World 
Bank, 2007a:14). Insofar as these underlying factors remain unchanged, high real rates may reappear 
in a low inflation environment. Hence the Strategy document is correct in its focus on financial sector 
regulation and reform as the best way of bringing down the cost of funds through reducing bank risk 
(p. 24). 
In the face of this credit shortage and a weak commercial banking sector the proposal to establish a 
national state-run Development Bank to provide long-run finance for industry is understandable. State-
owned Development Banks have gone out of fashion in recent years with many advising that a 
preferable option is the development of a commercial banking sector that can provide long-run finance 
on a more efficient basis. However, this option appears a long way off in Mongolia at the present time, 
and, as discussed elsewhere in this report, the creation of a Development Bank is one of the 
mechanisms recommended to mineral exporting economies to fund economic diversification. A state-
run Venture Capital Fund has also been discussed for Mongolia, but given the undeveloped nature of 
the stock market at present, such a Fund is likely to be premature.  
The case against Development Banks is that by attemp ing to combine commercial, economic and 
social objectives they can fund unviable projects which squander national resources. To avoid such 
risks clear criteria need to be established before projects are accepted. These must focus on the 
demonstrated potential net benefits to the economy from the projects concerned, as well as their 
financial viability. Techniques for assessing both the economic and financial returns of projects are 
readily available and have been applied by internatio l development agencies for many years (ADB, 
1997).10 To avoid the risk of multiple objectives confusing decision-taking, it is preferable not to 
incorporate employment generation or distributional change as criteria for project acceptance under 
Development Bank funding, leaving other policy instruments (such as labour training or social sector 
expenditure) to address these important considerations directly.  
International development agencies require the productive sector projects that they fund to be 
economically viable, so they generate an economic return at least as great as one that could be 
generated by alternative use of the funds, whilst in addition normally being financially viable.  This 
latter condition means that funds are lent to the project at their full cost and not at a subsidized interest 
rate.11 There has been much debate about high levels of interest rates in Mongolia (they were nearly 2 
per cent per month for short-term credit in early 2010) with (as has been seen) such rates reflecting a 
combination of high administrative costs and risk premiums. For relatively small projects a 
Development Bank should be able to spread risk and if run efficiently should be able to offer funds at 
a considerably lower interest rate than that prevailing in commercial banks at present. International 
experience suggests that the enforcement of commercial standards in the working of Development 
                                                   
10 Textbooks such as Curry and Weiss (2000), Potts (2002) and Thirlwall (2006) make clear the distinction 
between economic and financial effects. 
11 This can be done by discounting financial returns at a weighted cost of capital discount rate, for example, with 
the varying cost of funds from different sources incorporated in the calculation.  
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Banks is important both to minimize non-performing loans and reduce the misuse of development 
funds. It should be noted, however, that the practice suggested here of basing the cost of capital on 
international risk-free rates (as the definition of the opportunity cost of the funds) is an implicit 
subsidy, where commercial bank funds (if available at all) would be at a higher risk-adjusted rate (see 
Box 4).    
Box 4. Cost of credit in on-lending operations 
 
Where public funds – available from the general budget or from external sources – are 
provided to a Development Bank or to institutions to support SMEs or to provide micro loans, 
there is always the question of whether such funds should be provided on concessional terms. 
An interest rate subsidy is any difference between the borrowing rate charged and a full 
commercial rate. A commercial interest rate can be derived from a mark-up over the cost of 
funds to the government where the latter are specified as either the foreign borrowing cost 
(LIBOR plus the country margin) or the return on risk-free foreign assets (such as US 
Treasury Bills) where the funds would otherwise have been invested abroad. Hence: 
idom   =   ifor   +   c   +   fer   +  credr 
where idom is a domestic commercial interest rate; ifor is the foreign cost of funds to the 
government; c is the commission fee or margin to cover the administrative costs of the 
intermediary institution; fer is a mark-up to cover the foreign exchange risk where the funds 
are on-lent in domestic currency; credr is a mark-up to cover the specific borrower credit risk. 
In situations such as in Mongolia today credr may be perceived as high, contributing to the 
high interest rates. If the government wishes to prmote new activities it can provide 
Development Bank funding at interest rates that cover the sum of ifor, c and fer but ignore 
credr. Where loans are only offered for innovatory activity, this is equivalent to the subsidy for 
innovation recommended in the academic literature ref r ed to above. However, this is only a 
partial subsidy since the opportunity cost of the funds will still be covered. Ex ante perceptions 
of risk are uncertain of their nature, and if a high risk component credr accurately reflects 
probability of default, a low interest rate policy may put the financial viability of a 
Development Bank in question. However, against this Development Banks can take risks as 
part of their mandate and since their goal is overall economic impact, a small number of 
successful ventures funded by such a Bank can readily offset losses on high-risk borrowers 
who cannot repay. If the Development Bank can operate such a policy successfully, it will 
have the added benefit of signalling to commercial b nks that long-run credits for new 
activities can be repaid and need not entail very high interest charges to cover risk. 
 
The case for an interest-rate subsidy to support SMEs needs to be considered carefully. Recent 
discussion of industrial policy stresses support fo innovatory activities, rather than simply for 
particular sectors or firms of a particular size.12 Where public support for SMEs is involved there may 
be a case, as with Development Bank lending, for offering funds at a rate of interest based on the 
international rate for risk-free assets. This will be above the cost of concessional finance to the country 
and thus when funds are repaid at this rate they will generate a surplus for relending, but will be well 
below existing commercial rates. 
                                                   
12 Hausmann and Rodrik (2005:79) for example argue against support on the basis of size, arguing instead h t 
the key is to support activities that ‘have the potential to spawn new areas of specialisation’.  
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However, if large amounts of funds were to be channelled in this way, there is the risk that this would 
block the entry of the commercial banks into the SME segment of the market. An alternative approach, 
which has been applied in many countries to reduce the risks from SME lending, is for the government 
not to lend itself, but to offer intermediary institu ons credit guarantees for SME borrowing. This can
be important in a financial market such as that in Mongolia where banks and other financial 
institutions have little experience of SME lending and little credit information on potential borrowers. 
Guarantee schemes can thus help to ‘kick-start’ SME lending and allow the build-up of experience 
which will reduce the overhead cost per dollar lent.13 Such schemes typically guarantee up to 80 per 
cent of loans. 
2.4.2 Foreign Trade and Transport Costs 
Foreign trade in Mongolia operates in an open trading environment with low uniform import tariffs. 
The transport, communication, administrative and time costs involved in international trade are 
currently a more significant barrier. Whilst import tariffs are uniform at 5 per cent, transport costs 
alone are estimated to have averaged 18 per cent of the world price for exports and 10 per cent for 
imports in 2006 (UNDP, 2008: 115). Selective tariff protection to support nascent activities is possible 
under WTO rules and such a proposal was made by the Customs Tariff Council in 2006 but not 
followed up (UNDP, 2008: 87). When the Strategy document refers to import substitution in foods and 
consumer goods (p. 26), it does so without reference to tariff protection, with the implication that any 
such import replacement will occur through the growing competitiveness of domestic firms rather than 
being accelerated by tariff protection. Local firms already enjoy an element of natural protection 
associated with distance and the landlocked nature of the economy. Further, where transport costs are 
higher on final outputs than inputs, effective protection from this source (that is protection of value-
added) will be higher than nominal protection (protection on output).  
This report does not have sufficient data to calculte the effective protection created by trade costs at 
the sub-sector or product level.  However, as a rough indicator, the 2005 input-output table suggests an 
average value-added content in the output value of manufacturing of around 30 per cent.14 This low 
figure is the result of the import- intensive nature of much of the sector. If this figure is combined with 
a uniform nominal tariff of 5 per cent and a transport cost of 10 per cent, the protection on value added 
for domestic sales will be 15.5 per cent. However, high transport costs, whilst offering protection for
domestic sales, pose a serious barrier to exports, bo h in terms of a reduction in net revenue for a given 
world price and in delays. The latter are currently a particular concern for perishables and would be 
more so in the future were Mongolia to start exporting products required as inputs in a global 
production network organized on a just-in-time basis. In a simple numerical example the introduction 
of an average rate of transport cost of 18 per centfor exports is equivalent to a high export tax and 
generates a negative effective protection of -96 per cent; in other words value-added is virtually zero. 
Other assumptions give less extreme results but vale- dded in exporting is always considerably lower 
than what it would be in the absence of transport cs s (see Box 5). 
                                                   
13 Experience with credit guarantee schemes for SMEs is surveyed in World Bank (2007c), Chapter 4. The 
German aid agency, GTZ, already supports a number of credit guarantee schemes for small enterprise in 
Mongolia. 
14 The table is from the NSO Yearbook 2009 electronic version. 
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Box 5. Protection due to transport costs 
 
The standard effective protection formula can be modified to account for trade costs (including 
transport cost). Where i is an importable good and ∑j represents all purchased inputs j, value 
added per unit of i is 1-∑aji, where aji is the value of inputs of j required per unit of i. Import 
tariffs t and transport cost tr, defined as a propotion of the world price, will combine to raise 
domestic prices above prices in a trading partner. The formula for effective protection (ERP), or 
the proportionate increase in value-added due to tariffs nd transport costs, for an importable 
product sold in the domestic market, but which would otherwise have been supplied by imports 
from the trading partner is: 
ERPi  = [((1+ti)(1+tri)  -  ∑aji (1+tj)(1+trj))/(1- ∑aji)] - 1          (1)  
Where it is assumed tariffs are applied to the cif price at the border including the international 
transport cost from the supplier economy and where all inputs are also importable. 
Since the value added coefficient (1- ∑aji) is in the denominator, other things being equal, ERP 
rises as the share of value-added in output falls. It also rises more the greater is ti or tri relative 
to tj or trj or in other words the greater the protection on output relative to that on inputs.  
The treatment of exportable goods is different, however, since unless an export subsidy is given 
sales will be at the cif price at the border in the partner country minus the transport cost incurred 
in moving the good there. Where inputs are importable, unless an exemption or drawback 
scheme is in place, import tariffs and trade costs will still raise prices above those in the trading 
partner.  The formula for effective protection for an exportable good e is: 
ERPe  = [((1-tre) - ∑aji (1+tj)(1+trj))/(1- ∑aji)] -1                   (2) 
The orders of magnitude can be illustrated by taking the average transport cost data for imports 
of 10% (so tri and trj = 0.10) and for exports of 18% (tre = 0.18). Import tariffs are set at the 
uniform rate of 5% (so ti and tj=0.05) and the value-added coefficient is taken as the average for 
manufacturing of approximately 30% (so 1 - ∑aji = 0.3). Putting these values into (2) gives:  
ERPi   = [((1.10*1.05) – 0.70*(1.10*1.05))/(1-0.70)] - 1 = 0.155 or 15.5% protection on value-
added in the production of an importable good. 
For the exportable putting the values into (1) gives: 
ERPe  = [((1-0.18) – 0.70*(1.10*1.05))/(1-0.70)] - 1 = -0.96 or -96% 
In other words, with this combination of high transport cost value added virtually disappears 
and is 96% less than what it would be in the absence of tariffs or transport cost. Assuming 
transport costs are 10%, rather than 18%, of the fob value of exports and that imported inputs 
can have tariffs waived or refunded gives: 
ERPe  = [((1-0.10) – 0.70*(1.10))/(1-0.70) ] - 1 = -0.57 or -57%.  
In this case value-added is now roughly half what it would be in the absence of transport costs. 
Source: Weiss (2010). 
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It is well-known that the transport infrastructure of Mongolia is seriously deficient and in need of 
modernization. The main port of export, Tianjin in China, is 1,700 km from Ulaanbaatar with high rail 
costs per km. Complications with different railway gauges in Mongolia, Russia and China, the age of 
track, rolling stock and locomotives combine to give high freight costs for goods moved by rail. Table 
7 compares these costs per km for Mongolia and landlocked Central Asian Republics.  In addition, 
lack of adequate trade facilitation facilities at the border causes further delays, and gives the 
opportunity for informal payments to customs officials to expedite the process. The average border 
crossing time is said to be around 25 hours with a maximum of 75 hours, which is well above the 
average for landlocked countries in East Asia (World Bank 2007a: 23). Road conditions are also poor; 
they restrict the diversion of many products from rail to road transport and limit the size of the 
domestic market. 


















3,380 2,720 2,040 3,100 1,700 1,700 
Cost 
US$/TEU/km 
0.37 0.35 0.59 0.34 0.61 0.87 
Note: TEU is twenty foot equivalent unit container. 
Source: World Bank (2007a: Table 13). 
These transport bottlenecks are fully understood and the Strategy document contains ambitious plans 
for projects to modernize both road and rail transport. These plans require very substantial investmen, 
some of which may come from the Mongolia Development Fund, some from international financial 
institutions, with the remainder, it is hoped, coming from the private sector. Both the World Bank and
the ADB are already supporting various transport projects in Mongolia, such as the ADB road project 
between Choir and Zamyn Ud and the Regional Altai Western Corridor project, both of which link to 
the border with China. Proposed new projects are to link mining sites earmarked for development with 
the border as well as the improvement of roads in urban areas. The cost of three large road projects 
included in the top priority list of the National Development and Innovation Committee for 2011-2015 
alone is put at US$3.3 billion by the National Development and Innovation Committee. In addition, 
rail construction costs for new lines have been estimated by the World Bank at US$1.0-1.2 million per 
km, rising to US$2 million for difficult terrain (ADB 2009: 46-48). The rail modernization project 
included in the top priority list of the National Development and Innovation Committee has a cost of 
US$800 million. The government has only recently approved plans for 5,000 km of new rail lines to 
be built in phases over the next few years.15 If the cost estimates per km are accurate this is a minimum 
of US$5 billion of new investment. 
2.4.3 Investment Climate 
The government is committed to an improvement in the business environment by streamlining public 
bureaucracy and reducing the scope for informal payments to circumvent licensing and other 
regulatory requirements. The Business Investment Council, a high-level body chaired by the Prime 
Minister, was set up in 2008 with the support of the EBRD, to co-ordinate and to oversee such a 
                                                   
15 ‘Mongolia’s rail project on track to shift exports’ Financial Times, 14 April 2010. 
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dialogue.16 In addition, private-sector bodies, such as the Mongolia National Chamber of Commerce, 
make representations on changes they would like to see introduced. Mongolia takes its ranking in the 
World Bank Doing Business country survey very seriously, to the extent that it aims to become one of 
the top ten regional destinations for doing business in Asia by 2012. Table 8 gives the position of 
Mongolia and several Central Asian comparator economies in the 2010 survey.  
Mongolia’s overall ranking is middle level (60th out of 183 countries) and not very different from 
earlier years. Mongolia’s FDI is not likely to increase given its relatively poor business rankings and 
tight world credit markets. However, it appears to have made significant improvements in the area of 
contract enforcement (36th in 2010 as compared with 51st in 2004), and it also does reasonably well 
under the headings of protecting investors and regist ring property. Where it compares very 
unfavourably with other countries (155th) is in the area of foreign trade (for example in the cost and 
time required to export) due to the transport bottlenecks, although export costs per container are now 
below those in the Central Asian Republics included in Table 8. This conclusion is also supported by 
the country’s ranking by the World Bank Logistics Performance Index where Mongolia comes 136th. It 
should be noted that this relatively positive picture in terms of improvements to the legal position and
gradual reduction in corruption is at odds with theconclusions of the firm survey conducted by the 
ADB as part of its review of private-sector operations in Mongolia (ADB, 2009: 18-1). Although the 
sample size is relatively small and restricted to Ulaanbaatar, both contract enforcement and other legal
issues are mentioned as problems by many firms. 





























Mongolia 22.8 8 46 2,131 32 30.6 314 
Azerbaijan 40.9 9 46 2,980 39 18.5 237 
Kazakhstan 35.9 11 89 3,005 38 22.0 390 
Kyrgyz Rep. 59.4 7 63 3,000 39 29.0 1,460 
Uzbekistan 94.9 7 71 3,100 42 22.2 195 
Cambodia 22.7 11 22 732 44 102.7 401 
Vietnam 40.1 6 22 756 34 28.5 295 
East Asia- 
Pacific average 
36.1 6 23 909 37 48 538 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2010 (available at www.doingbusiness.org). 
Further insights into the business environment as perceived by firms are given by the Doing Business 
rankings, which allow a comparison of the results for Mongolia, the East Asia and Pacific region, and 
the World. Selected indicators from this survey are summarized in Table 9. They show that firms in 
Mongolia report that they wait longer than firms elewhere to obtain licences and a higher proportion 
than elsewhere expect to give unofficial payments to receive these. However, corruption is not 
perceived to be a particular problem as compared with elsewhere and a much lower proportion of 
firms expect to have to make payments ‘to get things done’ than in the region generally. Trade 
facilitation appears more of a problem than elsewhere, however, and in particular time for exports to 
clear customs, at an average of 19 days, is three times the global average. 
 
                                                   
16 The establishment of a high-level council on industrial policy for competitiveness chaired by the Prime 
Minister or President is one of the central recommendations of Hausmann and Rodrik (205: 77) for the 
implementation of their vision of industrial policy. 
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Table  9. World Bank Enterprise Survey 2009: selected results 
Variable Mongolia Region World 
Days to obtain operating licence 44 26 28 
Days to obtain construction permit 73 43 67 
Firms identifying licensing as major constraint (%) 32 14 16 
Firms expecting to make informal payments to get 
things done (%) 
30 60 30 
Firms expecting to give gifts to get licence (%) 31 18 16 
Firms identifying corruption as major constraint (%) 31 30 37 
Days for exports to clear customs 19 5 6 
Firms identifying customs and trade regulations as 
major constraint (%) 
24 18 17 
Source: Mongolia National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2009), Snapshots of the Mongolian Economy: 
The Tool for Policymakers and Business Leaders. 
2.4.4 New Technologies and Skills Development  
Despite its relatively well-developed education system inherited from the Soviet tradition, Mongolia 
remains far from a skill-based economy. The most detailed evidence on technology development and 
skills comes from an analysis of firm survey data collected in 2004-5 by the World Bank as part of its 
investment climate work (World Bank 2007d). This reveals that roughly one third of all firms identify 
a skills shortage as either a major or a severe constrai t, whilst in the garment sector the proportion is 
over half. A lack of problem-solving ability and insufficient knowledge of the English language and 
computing are cited as generic problems. Within manuf cturing, firms tend to give computers to only 
a small minority of workers and only a minority of firms conduct any R and D of their own, although 
around half report introducing a new technology that changed the way in which they operate (see 
Table 10).  
Table 10. Technology and innovation  in Mongolian manufacturing firms (2004) 
Firm category 
% of staff working with 
computers 
% of firms 
conducting R and D 
% of firms which introduced 
a new technology 
Textiles 9.0 37.5 43.8 
Wood products 8.7 33.3 44.4 
Food and beverages 11.2 38.8 50.0 
Garments 2.7 24.4 48.9 
Tanning of leather  6.2 18.2 54.6 
All firmsa  20.6 33.1 38.8 
Note: a Covers all sectors. 
Source: Mongolia Investment Climate Survey 2004, cited n World Bank (2007d: Table 3). 
Roughly half of manufacturing firms provide some training, although only to a small minority of 
workers, the vast majority of whom are initially classed as skilled. Hence firms themselves do little to 
upgrade unskilled workers (see Table 11). 
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Table 11. Training in Mongolian manufacturing firms 
Firm category 
% of firms offering 
training 
% of workers receiving 
training 
% of skilled workers 
out of those receiving 
training 
Textiles 62.5 19.1 71.7 
Wood products 22.5 14.6 70.0 
Food and beverages 50.0 26.1 73.2 
Garments 46.7 19.4 65.8 
Tanning of leather  54.6 19.3 83.3 
Source: Mongolia Investment Climate Survey 2004, cited n World Bank (2007d: Table 4). 
There is a growing dualism in the labour market, with a small protected segment benefitting from 
social insurance and employment protection and a growing informal sector. Although the education 
system is producing proportionately large numbers of school, vocational and higher education 
graduates, firms’ responses to the survey express seriou  concerns over the skill mix available. Out-
migration of well qualified graduates is also an issue, although it has provided a significant stream of 
remittances. 
The Strategy document reveals an awareness of the skills gap that has emerged in Mongolia since the 
transition. It refers to a plan to establish both training and separate research centres, and sets an 
ambitious national target of 3 per cent of GDP being spent on R and D by 2021. Given the very low 
existing level of R and D undertaken, this looks highly ambitious. Furthermore, two of the top priority 
projects of the National Development and Innovation Committee involve high-technology activities –
the development of a science park for a projected 22 companies in the bio- and nano-technology fields 
and an information technology training and research centre. The combined cost of these schemes is put 
at US$500 million. The lack of an existing technological base in these areas makes these extremely 
ambitious projects, whose implementation may well have to be scaled back.  
2.5 Mongolia: Export Structure and Comparative Advantage  
Where new ideas and new products come from will be determined by the initiative of the private 
sector. There is ample evidence, as discussed above, that Mongolia’s industrial structure is skewed 
towards a small number of categories. However, if there are many goods into which Mongolia could 
potentially move, production of high-skill and technology-intensive goods is likely to be held back by 
the skills and knowledge gap between Mongolia’s current attainment and world best practice that has 
widened since the transition. Detailed insight into existing comparative advantage is available from an 
analysis of export data for 2006, the most recent yar for which 4-digit level data are available, from 
the UN COMTRADE database. This reveals a highly skewed structure in which manufactures have a 
very minor role. Table 12 gives all the 4-digit HS categories in which Mongolia had a revealed 
comparative advantage in 2006 (defined as categories wh re their share in Mongolia’s exports exceeds 
the categories’ share in world trade). It also shows whether Mongolia was gaining or losing world 
market share in these categories and the PRODY value for each category. Since Mongolia’s exports 
are highly concentrated, these categories cover about 96 per cent of total exports in 2006. Moreover, of 
this the bulk, 74 per cent, was in mineral exports, 15 per cent in foods or animal-related products like
leather and only 7 per cent in manufacturing. In other words manufactures in which the country had a 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA>1.0) accounted for only 7 per cent of total exports in 2006. The 
majority of this 7 per cent was in textiles. 
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Table 12. Mongolia’s comparative advantage in 2006 
HS category Description RCA 




Non-manufactures     
0115 Meat of horses 119.7 + 9,387 
0116 Edible offal 2.4 + 13,950 
0129 Meat 11.9 n. s. 10,869 
0577 Nuts 3.7 + 4,904 
0619 Sugar 2.4 n. s. 2,428 
2112 Calf skins 29.4 + 4,817 
2114 Goat skins 3.9 - 2,470 
2119 Hides and skins 1.7 - 8,159 
2120 Rape seeds 4.4 n. s. 15,599 
2633 Cotton waste 1.9 n. s. 4,623 
2682 Wool degreased 27.3 + 19,413 
2683 Fine animal hair 2,025.9 + 3,163 
2685 Horsehair 333.4 + 4,492 
2686 Waste wool 61.1 + 10,819 
2687 Sheep wool 745.8 + 3,566 
2785 Quartz 198.3 + 5,310 
2815 Iron ore and concentrates 2.8 n. s. 16,842 
2871 Copper ore 117.9 - 8,442 
2874 Lead ore 2.5 n. s. 9,137 
2875 Zinc ore 60.2 n. s. 6,437 
2879 Ores and concentrates 26.2 + 4,781 
2911 Bones and ivory 6.3 - 1,839 
2919 Other materials of animal origin 5.5 - 8,561 
3222 Other coal 5.5 - 14,893 
3223 Lignite 5.9 n. s.  7,342 
6114 Leather 1.9 + 9,413 
6115 Sheep and lamb leather 113.7 + 2,793 
6116 Leather of other hides 22.6 + 4,738 
Manufactures     
6253 Tyres for aircraft 2.6 n. s. 10,759 
6354 Wood manufactures 2.7 + 3,762 
6512 Yarn of wool 1.6 + 14,263 
6583 Travelling rugs 1.0 - 8,707 
6592 Carpets 5.6 - 5,415 
6821 Copper alloys 1.7 + 8,181 
6852 Lead alloys 2.5 n. s. 11,549 
7243 Sewing machines 1.5 + 7,530 
8423 Male outerwear textile fabric 1.1 - 8,410 
8424 Male outerwear textile fabric 2.6 + 9,453 
8432 Female outerwear textile fabric 2.8 - 6,600 
8439 Female outerwear 2.6 - 10,549 
8441 Undergarments textile fabric 5.3 - 7,947 
8451 Outerwear knitted 2.7 - 15,241 
8452 Outerwear knitted 6.6 + 10,657 
8459 Outerwear knitted 1.1 - 11,189 
8462 Undergarments cotton 2.6 + 10,266 
8483 Fur clothing 1.2 + 17,808 
Others      
9419 Live animals  16.1 + 5,542 
9710 Gold 26.0 + 3,685 
Notes: n. s. means non-specified due to gaps in data. RCA is the share of category x in Mongolia’s exports 
divided by the share of category x in world exports. 
Source: Calculated from UN COMTRADE database. 
Table 13 gives a breakdown of all 4-digit HS textile categories. It shows that even within this 
relatively established sub-sector not all products had a comparative advantage, and in many categories 
exports declined over the period 2000-2006, with a consequent loss of world market share. The 
PRODY figures reveal a difference in values between categories and the fact that whilst Mongolia has 
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a comparative advantage in some of the higher value categories it does not in others (such as HS 8429, 
8465, 8472, 8482 ). Overall Mongolian textile exports in total declined by 3.1 per cent annually in 
2000-2006. The large fluctuations between categories imply inconsistent classification between years. 
This is a cause of the very low RCA ratios in some categories, which in some instances are close to 
zero because of very low export values in 2006. 
This problem of inconsistency in trade classification is almost certainly the explanation for the 
emergence and then disappearance of new export products, many of them manufactures. The World 
Bank (World Bank, 2007a: 24) used the apparent emergence of new products, a majority of them 
manufactures, as evidence of innovation in Mongolia.  However, the UN COMTRADE export 
statistics show many zero entries at the 4-digit level in the years up to 2005, while in 2006 there ar 
entries in all 4-digit categories, suggesting a re-classification, rather than genuine new exports. 
Table 13. Mongolia’s textile exports  








8421 Male outerwear: textile fabrics 0.10 8,617 -57 
8422 Male outerwear: textile fabrics 0.96 8,245 -24 
8423 Male outerwear: textile fabrics 1.13 8,410 -23 
8424 Male outerwear: textile fabrics 2.58 9,453 23 
8429 Male outerwear: textile fabrics 0 10,699 -70 
8431 Female outerwear: textile fabrics 0.15 9,853 -25 
8432 Female outerwear: textile fabrics 2.79 6,600 -14 
8433 Female outerwear: textile fabrics 0.05 8,205 -41 
8434 Female outerwear: textile fabrics 0.36 8,087 -5 
8435 Female outerwear: textile fabrics 0.49 8,389 -25 
8439 Female outerwear: textile fabrics 2.60 10,549 5 
8441 Under-garments: textile fabrics 5.28 7,947 -3 
8442 Under-garments: textile fabrics 0.24 7,956 -25 
8443 Under-garments: textile fabrics 0 6,908 -50 
8451 Outerwear knitted 2.70 15,241 -6 
8452 Outerwear knitted 6.56 10,657 77 
8459 Outerwear knitted 1.06 111,189 6 
8462 Undergarments 2.64 10,266 126 
8463 Undergarments 0.54 9,947 72 
8464 Undergarments 0.07 5,316 -11 
8465 Corsets, garters 0 12,035 n. s. 
8471 Clothing accessories: textile fabrics 0 7,907 -54 
8472 Clothing accessories: knitted 0.02 11,180 22 
8481 Apparel: leather 0.04 8,604 90 
8482 Apparel: other 0 11,066 n. s. 
8483 Fur clothing 1.17 17,808 14 
Notes: n. s. means non-specified due to gaps in data.  RCA is the share of category x in Mongolia’s exports 
divided by the share of category x in world exports. 
Source:  Calculated from UN COMTRADE database. 
The top 25 HS 4-digit categories listed in Table 14 contributed 93 per cent of the EXPY for Mongolia 
in 2006, with copper alone contributing nearly 50 per cent. Manufactures comprise nine out of the 25 
categories, but in total they contribute only 9 perc nt to EXPY with textiles contributing virtually all 
of this.  
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2871 Copper ore and concentrates; copper matte; cement 41.34% 3490.4 1 
9710 Gold, non-monetary  17.57% 647.7 2 
3222 Other coal, not agglomerated 2.93% 436.8 3 
2875 Zinc ores and concentrates 5.93% 381.7 4 
2687 Sheep's or lambs' wool, or of other animal hair, etc. 5.40% 192.6 5 
3330 Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous 1.29% 182.2 6 
8451 Outerwear knitted or crocheted 1.15% 174.7 7 
2879 Ores and concentrates of other non-ferrous base me 3.19% 152.6 8 
2683 Fine animal hair, not carded or combed 4.34% 137.4 9 
2815 Iron ore and concentrates, not agglomerated 0.75% 125.8 10 
8439 Women’s, girls’, infants’ outerwear, textile, etc. 1.18% 124.9 11 
2785 Quartz, mica, felspar, fluorspar, etc. 2.28% 121.  12 
8462 Undergarments, knitted or crocheted, etc. 0.98% 100.7 13 
6821 Copper and copper alloys, refined or not, etc. 1.05% 86.2 14 
0115 Meat of horses, asses, mules and hinnies, fresh, etc. 0.67% 62.8 15 
8441 Undergarments of textile fabrics, etc. 0.68% 53.7 16 
2682 Wool degreased, uncombed of sheep or lambs 0.28% 53.7 17 
8459 Outerwear knitted or crocheted, not elastic, ec. 0.48% 53.5 18 
6115 Sheep and lamb skin leather 1.60% 44.7 19 
8452 Outerwear knitted or crocheted, not elastic, ec. 0.38% 40.9 20 
6114 Leather of other bovine cattle and equine leather 0.41% 38.5 21 
7810 Passenger motor vehicles (excluding buses) 0.19% 34.9 22 
2919 Other materials of animal origin 0.31% 26.9 23 
8423 Men's and boys' outerwear, textile fabrics, etc. 0.31% 26.0 24 
0111 Bovine meat, fresh, chilled or frozen 0.31% 25.1 25 
Source: calculated from COMTRADE data base.  
The export structure shows many distinct gaps, withMongolia not exporting many high value goods 
(in terms of PRODY). Therefore there is ample scope to move into new, higher value goods. The 
difficulty of moving into a new product is linked directly with the degree of specificity of the asset, 
capabilities and operating environment (such as the p ysical assets, labour skills, technological 
knowledge and infrastructure needs) associated withthe products in which a country is currently 
specialized. Where these attributes are either veryg neral – that is relevant for the production of a 
wide range of goods – or production conditions are similar in the new products, the transition to a new 
specialization may be relatively easy. Thus for example it could be expected to be easier for Mongolia 
to move to higher value textile products than to prduction of pharmaceuticals, since the skills sets and 
technologies required by this latter combination of g ods are different.  For any economy there will be 
some ‘new goods’ (ones in which it is not currently specialized), which are relatively easy to move 
into. These are ‘nearby’ products where economic distance is low, due to the similarity of the assets 
and capabilities they require relative to those needed by the economy’s current pattern of 
specialisation. 
The concept of economic distance is developed formally by Hausmann and Klinger (2006) who 
calculate the probability that two countries will both have a comparative advantage in different pairs of 
products. The higher the probability the lower is the distance between the two products. If products are 
grouped by broad classifications some are found to be peripheral in the sense that distance is low 
within the group, but high between the group and others. These peripheral groups are typically primary 
products, but also include garments. Groups where distance is particularly low and where it is 
relatively easy to move between products are machinery and capital-intensive manufactures 
(Hausmann and Klinger 2008: 21). Countries already specialized in these goods should therefore find 
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it easier to develop new exports products, whilst those like Mongolia, where specialization is in 
peripheral groups, face a greater challenge. 
2.6 Summary 
• The current industrial structure and trade specialization is highly skewed and there are many 
manufactures that Mongolia currently does not produce. The development of new activities is 
best left to the decisions of the private sector with the government providing support in the 
form of credits, improved infrastructure, and training and education initiatives. Nevertheless, 
one would expect these new activities to be initially in areas economically close to existing 
activities in mineral and garment production, rather than in brand new manufacturing 
initiatives. 
• It should not be assumed that mineral processing is necessarily economically viable and 
sensible for economies with mineral reserves. This applies to both copper smelting and coal 
cleaning, as well as a range of metallurgical activities. 
• Other options for industrial diversification include the modernization of traditional activities, 
such as textiles, and the development of totally new activities. 
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3. The Mining Sector 
3.1 Introduction 
Mineral experts and multinational mining companies are aware of the vast mineral deposits in 
Mongolia. Recently, the country’s mineral endowment has attracted considerable attention from the 
international press. The following quotations are a sample from national and international newspapers 
highlighting the potential interest of multinational mining companies in exploiting the mineral deposits 
of Mongolia, and the attention that the Mongolian government wants to give to its mining sector: 
“A number of multinational companies, BHP Billiton Ltd., India’s Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. 
Brazil’s Vale and Peabody Energy Corp, among others, a e competing for the rights to 
develop Mongolia’s prized US$2 billion Tavan Tolgoi coal mine, which is often referred to 
as the world’s biggest untapped coking coal deposit.  Mongolia will take a 51 per cent stake 
in the coal mine and auction the remaining 49 per cent to bidders” (The UB Post, 1 June 
2010). 
“Mongolia has world-class reserves of gold, copper, coal fluorspar, silver, uranium and 
tungsten, but has been deterred by a combination of corruption and political instability. 
Mongolia wants to attract US$25 billion in investment over the next five years to build roads, 
railways and new towns needed to exploit its natural wealth” (The Daily Telegraph, 12 April 
2010).  
“Mongolia, a resource-rich country lacking roads and rail, has taken its first step in building 
the infrastructure required to be a leading commodities exporter, after it approved 
construction of more than 5,000 km of railways...Mong lia is emerging as one of the world’s 
premier frontiers for copper, coal, gold and iron ore. Its proximity with China, the world’s 
biggest consumer of many raw materials, is a huge advantage, along with the sheer volume 
of metals beneath its grasslands. But it remains one of the world’s most remote places, and 
the country’s lack of basic infrastructure undermines its prospects” (The Financial Times, 14 
April 2010). 
A crucial strategic question for economic development is how far it is economically justifiable to 
adopt the adding value strategy for mineral processing that is a central plank of Mongolia’s current 
development strategy, rather than relying on exporting minerals in unprocessed form. Some proposals 
currently under debate imply moving to copper smelting and refining and steel-making, as well as coal 
treatment and enrichment to produce power. The economics of processing involves a comparison 
between the net value addition (and any transport cost saving) and the extra capital and related costs of 
processing. Processing of some, or all, of the minerals may be justifiable but the case needs to be made 
carefully and not simply assumed. The industrialization experiences of many countries provide a 
warning that simply because it is technically possible to produce particular goods because of the 
availability of natural resources, domestic production is not necessarily economically sensible. This 
applies not just to copper smelting but to the range of metallurgical activities covered by several of 
Mongolia’s priority projects. The scale of production and the potential market will be critical factors. 
Also, given the position of China, it will be important to assess whether there will be a demand for the 
processed products in China.  
Mongolia has major reserves of 80 different minerals including copper, gold, coking coal, iron ore, 
fluorspar, molybdenum, and crude oil. The Oyu Tolgoi mine, in particular, is said to be the world’s 
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largest copper mine (Boston Consulting Group, 2009). Copper concentrate and gold dominate exports, 
and the high copper prices of 2006-2008 provided a major boost to government revenues, and fostered 
the current policy aim of a rapid transformation of the economy to middle-income status by 2021. 
According to the USGS (2009) the most important minerals in Mongolia are the following: non-
ferrous metals: copper, gold, lead, zinc; ferrous metals: iron; energy minerals: uranium and coal; and
other minerals: metallurgical coke and fluorspar. 
This chapter considers whether it makes economic sense for the country to engage in costly projects in 
order to increase the value-added of some of its abundant minerals. To make specific decisions on 
which minerals to process, comprehensive feasibility studies are required, which is beyond the scope 
of this study. 
3.2 Distinctive Characteristics of the Mining Industry 
The mining industry can be best understood as a global industry where there are a great number of 
companies participating in each mineral market. Thelarge number of companies in different mineral 
markets suggests that entry and exit to these markets is not difficult. It seems that established mining 
companies are not capable of blocking the access of new firms. Indeed, rather than obstructing it , they 
often welcome the entry of new firms in order to have more opportunities to specialize their own 
activities and to diversify investment risk. For instance, by establishing joint ventures, major 
companies can reduce their risk exposure to different investment projects, especially in countries with 
high political instability. 
In general, finding mineable resources and developing the infrastructure necessary to operate a new 
mine requires considerable initial investment in specific assets (e.g., engineering and consulting 
services, open-pit or underground mine construction, mechanical shovels, cranes, heavy trucks, mining 
ramps, etc.). Once a mine is built, the initial investment becomes irreversible and much of it also 
becomes irrecoverable. The time between the initial investment and positive cash flow is often more 
than 20 years. This creates tremendous investment risk. Incumbents have the advantage of having a 
diversified portfolio of projects at various stages, which reduces their risk, and also have access to 
credit markets that are typically not available to new firms. Growth therefore tends to be fairly slow, 
with new firms starting small and growing over time as they build their asset base. 
Exit from mining is mainly constrained by these large fixed investments and sunk costs that cannot be 
easily recovered and restrict the capacity of mining companies to shut down operations and walk 
away. There are other relevant barriers to exit. High closure costs associated with land reclamation and 
environmental restoration of mine sites may force mining companies not to leave the business in order 
to avoid these significant costs, at least for some ti . There are also social pressures to continue 
mining, as mining activity in rural areas is often the only source of non-agricultural employment.  
3.3 Mineral Markets for Mongolia 
Minerals have standardized features; they are widely traded internationally, and their prices are set 
according to variations in world supply and demand. Within each mineral type the product is relatively 
homogeneous, and branding is difficult. Diamonds have been the only mineral to pursue branding 
successfully. Minerals can also be substituted for each other in their uses. Copper and aluminium are 
substitutes in the conduction of electricity, and eergy commodities are substitutes in the generation of 
heat. Such homogeneity and substitutability severely limit the market power of any one producer or 
group of producers. 
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Prices tend to vary across mineral commodities according to their relative scarcity; production costs, 
which depend on the technology employed to extract the commodity; the characteristics of the 
deposits; tax regimes applied to each mineral product in different countries; transportation costs 
(affected by the location of the major centres of cnsumption for each particular mineral); the 
existence of quasi-rents required to cover past investments; macroeconomic fluctuations (e.g. changes 
in global aggregate demand and variations in exchange rates), and pure rents originated by market 
power.  
Table 15. Industrial features of minerals  
Mineral 
HHI at a 
country level 
HHI at a firm 
level 
Share of world production 
by companies 
Share of world production 
by countries in 2009 (%) 
Copper 1,621, moderate 
level of 
concentration 
558, low level of 
concentration 
Fifteen companies produced 
66% of overall copper 
production in 2009. 
Chile (33.7%); Peru (7.9%); 
United States (7.5%) 
Copper 
smelters  
945, low level of 
concentration 
959, low level of 
concentration 
Three companies (CODELCO, 
Freeport-McMoran and BHP) 
had control over 28.9% 




1,009, low level 
of concentration 
977, low level of 
concentration 
Three companies (CODELCO, 
Aurubis and Freeport-
MCMoran) had control over 
22% 
China (22.0%); Chile (17.5%); 
Japan (7.7%) 
Golda 1,001, low level 
of concentration 
805, low level of 
concentration 
Five companies (Barrick, 
Newmont, Anglogold Ashanti, 
and Gold Fields) possess 
27.8% of the market 
China (12.8%); Australia 
(9.4%); United States (8.9%) 
Iron ore 2,290, high level 
of concentration 
950, low level of 
concentration 
Fifteen companies produced 
56%  
China (39.7%); Brazil (16.8%); 
Australia (16.3%) 
Coal b From 8,450 to 
1,061 
839, low level of 
concentration 
The sixteen largest companies 
control 31% 
China; United States; Ukraine; 
Russia; Australia 






Sixteen companies control 96% Canada (20.1%); Kazakhst n 
(19.7); Australia (19.6%) 
Lead 1,703, moderate 
level of 
concentration 
2,077, high level 
of concentration 
China’s state-owned companies 
control 43.3% 
China (43.3%); Australia 
(13.2%); United States (10.2%) 
Zinc 1,467, moderate 
level of 
concentration 
958, low level of 
concentration 
Fifteen companies control 
15.5% 
China (25.1%); Peru (13.2%); 
Australia (11.7%) 




Information not available China (58.9%); Mexico 
(18.1%); Mongolia (5.5%) 
Notes: a Other fundamental factors like global demand fluctuations, financial turmoil, or the buying or selling 
gold by central banks are major market drivers thatcan have a more important effect on gold prices than 
industry concentration and oligopoly power. b Usually coal is classified into four main types: anthracite, 
bituminous coal, sub-bituminous coal and lignite. This ranking depends on the quantity of carbon atoms that 
each type contains and on the amount of heat energy that each kind can produce. China is the largest producer 
of coal worldwide. It produces 91.85 per cent, 38.0 per cent, and 10.00 per cent of total anthracite, b uminous 
coal and sub-bituminous coal production, respectively. 
Source: Based on Davis (2010). 
Table 15 shows the degree of concentration in the various commodity markets at country and industry 
level by using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). It is calculated by summing up the squares of 
the individual market shares of all the participants i  a relevant market. Its value goes from 0, meaning 
no concentration, to 10,000, meaning absolute concentration by one producer. According to the 
industrial organization literature a high level of c ncentration might be associated with the exercise of 
market power and, possibly, with adverse competitiv consequences. A low degree of concentration 
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means that it is unlikely that few individual companies are able to take over the market by setting 
prices.  
Table 15 also shows the companies that control the production of specific minerals and the share of 
world production accounted for by the top three countries. 
Primary mineral producers generally do not gain market power by differentiating their products. 
Differentiation may be relevant for trading final products like copper wire, rods, finished steel, and 
gem quality diamonds. However, markets for final products are usually beyond the scope of mining 
companies, so product differentiation is, in general, not a concern for producers. This fact contributes 
to the degree of competition in the mining industry, because market power generated through product 
differentiation is often ruled out. 
Mineral commodities can also be substituted by other commodities or materials. In this context, 
primary mining producers of a particular commodity face strong competition from both substitutes and 
the secondary supply of the commodity (i.e. scrap recycling). Thus, primary producers face a very 
competitive environment in the minerals markets.  
3.4 Processing Minerals 
International evidence suggests that it is not inevitable that countries with processing industries will
themselves have mineral deposits. Raw material or mineral exporters are more likely to move into 
simple manufactures like garments than into mineral p ocessing. International trade specialization in 
pairs of products (measured by the probability that a country exports both with a comparative 
advantage) is explained in a regression model that uses as independent variables measures of product 
technological characteristics, factor endowments and the strength of a forward linkage (that is the 
extent to which one product is an input into another as measured by data from the US input-output 
table). If processing is important as a form of specialization, it is to be expected that the degree of 
forward linkage from good A to good B will have a strong and significant impact on the probability 
that any country exports both products. However, foward linkages prove to have a much weaker 
impact in explaining joint exports than do factor endowments or technological characteristics of 
products. Hausmann et al. (2008b) explain this by reference to the concept of national capabilities, so 
that countries producing primary goods such as minerals have a skill set which is closer to that 
required by other primary goods or technologically simpler consumer goods than that required by 
downstream mineral processing. In the context of mineral processing in South Africa (what they term 
beneficiation) they conclude that:  
“There is no reason to pay special attention to downstream sectors at the expense of 
missed opportunities from the entire set of ‘lateral’ sectors that don’t currently exist. The 
case is actually stronger: not only is such an approach without conceptual justification: it 
is a bet against the whole of international experience. Quite simply beneficiation is a bad 
policy paradigm.” (Hausmann et al., 2008b: 3).  
The warning is salutary, although generalizations of this sort need to be treated with caution.  The 
question of the economic viability of moving into mineral processing can only be resolved on a 
project-by-project basis through careful analysis of feasibility studies and projections of world market 
trends. The costs and benefits to a country over time need to be estimated and rates of return compared 
with the appropriate alternatives available. 
If foreign investors are involved in the co-funding of the proposed projects they will also need to be 
convinced of the viability of the schemes. If foreign investors are cautious about investing the 
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government should also think carefully about the viabil ty of the project. In the absence of positive 
externalities, where private investors are reluctant o invest on the basis of the expected financial 
returns, the only economic reason that would justify the government offering an incentive package 
would be a difference between the government’s and the foreign private sector’s discount rate.  
Following standard textbook procedures, a project is acceptable when its discounted stream of net 
benefits (net present value - NPV) is positive at the discount rate.17 There can be different 
interpretations of the discount rate, with foreign investors often adding a significant country risk 
premium and applying a rate that is well above either e real return available on other investments in 
the host country or the real return available in low-risk financial assets internationally.  As far as a 
government in a low-income country is concerned, its discount rate is usually defined as an 
opportunity cost rate reflecting real returns on alternative investments. Hence, to put things simply, if a 
foreign investor looks for a 20 per cent return in real terms, it may reject a project that makes a return 
of 12 per cent, even though this is a return that is above the government’s discount rate and hence is 
higher than the return available on other investmens i  the country either domestically or 
internationally. If foreign investment is essential for a project to go ahead, then it is justifiable for the 
government to offer the investor an incentive package.  
The gains to Mongolia from a foreign investment project will be determined by how much of the net 
financial benefits remain with the Government as royalties, profit taxes, and its share of dividends. In 
addition, any positive externalities not captured as financial benefits will also remain in the country, 
for example as gains to otherwise underemployed workers who get work either directly on the project 
or indirectly in supplier activities. However, it should also be remembered that there may be additional 
costs that fall under the heading of externalities – for example, infrastructure investment in transport 
links from the project site to the border that is not paid for by the project itself, or local environmental 
damage, the cost of which is not picked up by the project as mitigatory expenditure. The full economic 
return to the project must include the financial net b nefits plus or minus these additional external 
effects. The financial package offered to foreign investors – for example, royalty and profits tax rates, 
years of tax holiday and duration of mining leases – will have an important impact on the distribution 
of the net benefits between government and foreign investors. Other things being equal, higher tax and 
royalty payments raise the gain to the country but if they are too high they will deter foreign investors. 
Hence the outcome will be one of bargaining, with the more competition there is for mining leases and 
processing rights between investors, the stronger the government’s negotiating position and the higher 
these rates are likely to be. 
Box 6 gives illustrative calculations based on the recent presentation of the Boston Consulting Group, 
which examined the feasibility of copper smelting and coal processing at the Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan 
Tolgoi mines. 
                                                   
17 The alternative version has an acceptable project as one where the return on resources invested in the project 
over its lifetime is above the chosen discount rate. 
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Box 6. Economics of mineral processing 
 
The Boston Consulting Group (2009) examined the economic feasibility of processing and 
exporting coal (from Tavan Tolgoi) and copper (from Oyu Tolgoi) with associated investment in 
coking plant, iron smelter and an integrated railway system. It compared the additional GDP from 
an ‘extraction and export’ scenario with a ‘processing and export’ scenario. The latter had lower 
fluctuations in export revenue, and created more jobs and higher GDP. However, it had a 
considerably greater investment cost of US$13.9 billion (2010-2021), compared with US$4.8 
billion, due to the extra investment in processing facilities, power generation and the rail network. 
It is impossible to check the detailed analysis in this study since only the main results are 
available. However, the basic question of whether t extra GDP highlighted by the study is an 
adequate return on the extra investment involved can be addressed in a simple way.  The data on 
GDP in the two scenarios for 2010 -2021 can be compared to give incremental GDP due to 
processing. We do not have certain key data such as t e phasing of the investment expenditure 
between years and the working life of the plants. However, for illustrative purposes it is assumed 
all investment is made in 2010 (since net benefits are shown as arising in 2010) and that the 
operating life of the plants extends to 2031.  Taking incremental GDP as benefits and the extra 
investment cost in the comparison of the two scenarios gives the flow of net benefits 2010-2031. 
This net benefit flow implies a rate of return on investment of 10 per cent; that is the Internal Rate 
of Return (IRR) on the additional investment required in the processing scenario is 10 per cent. 
This is probably above the opportunity cost of capital in Mongolia (and is certainly above the real 
risk-free international interest rate), but is unlike y to be dramatically so. Further there are a 
number of qualifications that need to be made. Even assuming the relevant export prices and cost 
estimates are accurate, the use of incremental GDP as a measure of benefits is likely to be an 
overestimate. What matters is the income that remains in Mongolia (that is change in GNP) since 
much of the profits to foreign companies and payments to foreign workers will ultimately leave 
the country.  Second, not all payments to national labour need be net additions to GNP since only 
where all new jobs are filled by workers who would otherwise be openly unemployed will all of 
their wages be an economic benefit; in others words the opportunity cost of labour must be zero 
for the wage component of value-added to be treated s a benefit.  The full picture is further 
complicated by the financing arrangements for the project since foreign funding is a benefit to the 
country when it is received and a cost when it is repaid or repatriated. To illustrate the impact of 
both time and financing arrangements, if it is assumed the government bears 45 per cent of the 
project’s costs and receives 45 per cent of revenues, with these delayed until 2020 and with the 
project life extended to 2036, the IRR drops to 4 per cent. The conclusion is that the project is 
almost certainly less attractive than the analysis in Boston Consulting Group (2009) suggests, 
although we are not in a position to be definitive on whether this processing scheme is 
economically viable. 
 
3.5 Limitations on Processing Minerals 
There are several challenges unique to Mongolia that m ke moving into minerals processing and 
export either difficult or ineffective as a path to development. 
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i) Unemployment 
One of Mongolia’s chief concerns is unemployment. Resource-based industrialization is less labour-
intensive than manufacturing-based industrialization, and so producing and exporting primary 
processed materials is “likely to yield fewer of the distributional and social gains that East Asia reaped 
from massive expansion of manufacturing employment” (Owens and Wood 1997, p. 1467). Based on 
data from South Africa in the 1990s, Davis (1994, Table 7.3) finds iron and steel production and the 
production of other non-ferrous metals to be the least labour-intensive manufacturing processing 
activity. Labour-intensive manufacturing in value-added agricultural products and manufactures, such 
as textiles and apparel, would seem to be a natural area to pursue in reaping Mongolia’s small 
comparative advantage in manufactures while at the same time providing employment. At best, 
resource-based industrialization would create large-scale employment only in the construction phase. 
Most of that employment, and the employment in the processing industries, would be what are 
traditionally regarded as male jobs. The labour boom in the construction phase would not bet sustained 
in the operating phase. The remote location of these processing plants would create a situation where 
there would be high local unemployment once the construction is completed. 
ii) Water 
Fresh water availability in Mongolia will be a major constraint on some value-added mineral 
processing activities. Water consumption per ton of metal at copper smelters and refineries is some 16 
times the consumption at a mill. Based on Oyu Tolgoi’s estimated output, around 4 million cubic 
metres of fresh water would be consumed annually if a 500,000 tons per year (tpy) smelter is built to 
accept Oyu Tolgoi’s concentrate. 
iii) China 
Mongolia is further limited by China’s mineral policy and mineral needs. China (like Japan) has an 
official policy of encouraging the “export of deep-processed mineral products with high added value 
and the import of primary mineral products” (White Paper, 2003). This policy includes tariffs on 
imports of refined metals but no tariff on metal ores/concentrates. Since 71 per cent of Mongolia’s 
exports currently go to China, that country’s policies will greatly influence Mongolia’s ability to 
process minerals economically. 
There is also excess regional steel and copper smelting capacity. China is the world’s largest exporter 
of steel. The International Copper Study Group repots that there is a 5 million tpy excess copper 
smelting capacity in Asia. The excess is expected to grow to 6 million tpy by 2013. China alone is 
planning on adding 650,000 tpy capacity (Rebelo, 2009). That study states: “China will increase its 
dependence on foreign concentrates as few national copper mines are developed.” The advantage of 
being located next to China is its massive and growing demand for primary materials. However, 
careful market analysis is needed to examine whether processed copper and steel products produced in 
Mongolia could be sold in China. Figures 1 and 2 show China’s voracious appetite for copper and iron 
concentrates, importing more than 4 million tpy of c pper concentrate  (Oyu Tolgoi’s planned capacity 
is 0.5 million tpy) and 400 million tpy of iron ore. There are then going to be strong market incentivs 
that militate against value added processing of iron ore and copper concentrate in Mongolia. 
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Figure 1. Net imports of copper concentrate (thousand tons per year) 
 
Source: World Bureau of Metal Statistics, British Geological Survey, WTO. 
Figure 2. Net imports of iron ore (million tons per year) 
 
Sources: World Bureau of Metal Statistics, British Geological Survey, WTO, World Steel Association. 
iv) Natural Environment 
Mongolian official documents have repeatedly suggested that protecting the environment is a priority. 
Value-added mineral and energy processing consumes large amounts of environmental services, and 
plants that are built “clean” in Mongolia will be at  cost disadvantage to those in neighbouring 
countries. China’s mineral processing activities are known to be particularly dirty (and cheap), 
although there appears to be a directed effort to improve environmental standards. One of Mongolia’s 
strengths compared with other Asian countries would appear to be its relatively pristine steppe areas. 
The potential for mining and value-added processing to damage these areas and make them unsuitable 
for eco-tourism or biodiversity preservation should be a serious concern. 
v) Export diversification, sustainability 
It is difficult to see minerals processing as an effective route to export diversification or a remedy for 
any of the problems associated with a high export cncentration.  It is not mineral production that is 
damaging, but export concentration (Lederman and Maloney, 2007). Mineral export revenue 
diversification is unlikely to be successfully achieved by means of processing (iron ore, and iron and 
steel; coal, and electricity) due to the high price correlation between the primary and processed goods. 
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Instead, export concentration can best be reduced by increasing the variety of unprocessed minerals 
that are mined and exported. Mongolia has a remarkably diverse mix of world-class mineral deposits, 
in contrast to many nations such as Chile which can only export one or two profitably. Diversification 
of exports via a broader metals portfolio is likely to be quite effective given the low correlation 
between metal prices. Changes in monthly copper and gol  prices have a correlation coefficient of 
only 0.17, for example. Copper and iron ore prices are only correlated at 0.28, and thermal coal and 
iron ore at 0.19 (Davis, 2010). If Mongolia were able to establish exports in copper, iron ore, thermal 
coal and gold, its total export volatility would be r latively stable given these low correlation 
coefficients. 
vi) Infrastructure 
Infrastructure was listed in the Fraser Institute survey (McMahon and Cervantes, 2010) as one of the 
main limitations to investor interest in Mongolia’s mining assets. Infrastructure development is an 
important co-requisite for value-added processing of mineral products. During the infrastructure 
construction period there needs to be progress towards  stable land tenure and mining law. Industry 
opinion argues that the current legal situation is far too unstable to entice foreign direct investment 
without the foreign parties demanding large tax concessions in payment for the high perceived risk. 
Such high concessions will necessarily eat into the rev nue flow that the government is able to extract 
from the projects on behalf of the people, a politically unacceptable outcome: the 44 per cent effectiv  
project participation that Mongolia managed to negotiate for Oyu Tolgoi reflects in large part the 30-
year stability agreement and resultant reduction of political risk to the private parties investing in this 
project. 
3.6 Government Intervention 
International experience suggests that mineral exporting economies need to be very careful as to how 
they use their mineral income. Governments generally intervene in the mining business in order to 
obtain revenues and stimulate domestic economic activity. Tax policies are one of the most important 
factors affecting the attractiveness of private-sector mining investment in a country. In addition, 
governments may provide other incentives to promote inv stment in mineral assets. Regulations 
covering mining operating conditions, workers’ safety, and environmental damage are critical to 
guarantee proper functioning of the industry. Governments usually create specialized institutions like 
regulatory agencies in order to guarantee the proper enforcement of these regulations.  
Mongolia’s current production and trade patterns provide some indication as to where the emphasis on 
creating this value-added mineral processing might be placed. Since Mongolia currently has an open 
economy, existing export activities are likely to be competitively undertaken. The best value-added 
areas to support are likely to be those where exports are already successful or products that are similar 
to those that are successfully being exported in the current open market framework. The suggestion 
would be to support these exports (SITC Revision 2: Copper and copper alloys, refined or not, 6821; 
Copper and copper alloys, worked, 6822; Aluminium and luminium alloys, worked, 6842; and, Lead 
and lead alloys, worked, 6852) and other activities in the SITC 68 category, non-ferrous metals, since 
these are likely to require similar skill sets and i stitutional knowledge. Identifying export markets will 
be a key part of this latter analysis. 
Given Mongolia’s relatively young democracy and itslack of infrastructure, any move to 
industrialization should be slow and cautious, and support for these value-added processing activities 
should be given only after the profitability of each apital investment has been clearly identified 
through rigorous financial and technical analysis. If diversification away from minerals and energy is 
desired, alternative supplemental development paths such as the provision of eco-tourist services or 
basic low-skill manufactures should be evaluated. 
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Another recommendation would be not to pursue copper smelting or finished copper product exports 
as these have not been shown to be economic (see Boston Consulting Group, slide 11, which 
recommends exporting copper concentrate rather than copper cathode). Copper smelting in the south 
of Mongolia is also ill-advised given China’s 17 per c nt import tariff on processed copper.  
Many mineral and energy exporting nations have so-called Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF). These 
funds generally have one of two purposes. The firstis to set aside mineral tax revenues for use by 
future generations – the intergenerational income soothing effect. The second is to set aside mineral 
tax revenues in high price environments for use in low price environments – a short-term income 
smoothing effect. There is little agreement among economists that the first purpose is warranted. Real 
welfare has been increasing in each generation for as long as such measures have been recorded, and 
so there is little reason to impoverish current generations for the benefit of future ones. The short-term 
income smoothing enabled by SWFs is more reasonable. Chile, for example, used moneys in its SWF 
to partially finance a US$4 billion stimulus action in 2009. According to the SWF Institute, “[t]he 
[Chilean] package involves direct support for low-income families, additional public investment in 
infrastructure, tax cuts and other incentives for private investment, enhanced access to financing by 
small and medium companies, additional funds for labour retraining and a new hiring incentive, 
among other initiatives”.18 Norway’s SWF was created in 1990 in anticipation of gr wing government 
obligations towards pensioners as the Norwegian population ages. 
Figure 3. Estimated annual Mongolian Government revenues from Oyu Tolgoi, year by year, by 
source  
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Source: Davis (2010). 
The need for short-run income smoothing is indicated by Figure 3, which shows estimates of 
Mongolian government revenues from Oyu Tolgoi given forecast copper and gold prices over the life 
of the project. The volatility in tax income in this figure is due to changing geological and tax 
structures through the life of the mine. Copper andgold price volatility will further enhance the very 
erratic nature of these revenues. In the absence of a SWF, Mongolian officials will face immense 
                                                   
18 Refer to http://www.swfinstitute.org/beta/tag/stimulus-plan/.  
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pressures to spend these tax revenues as they are received, with no provisions for cutting spending in 
years where the tax flows fall. Governments then typically take on debt to fund the social programmes 
set up in the boom years in the hope that tax flows will rise again in the future. When such hopes are 
not realized, the mineral economies are faced with austerity programmes that can be destabilizing. It is 
for this reason that mineral price volatility is seen to be associated with the curse of natural resouces 
(Davis and Tilton, 2005). 
Successful SWFs require a strong legislative framework that outlines the circumstances under which 
spending from the fund can take place. They also requi  complete transparency. Revenue sterilization 
via offshore lending will also have to be considere if exchange rate or inflationary pressures become 
untenable. Among other measures recommended are a technical unit within the financial institution or 
a separate planning agency to apply rigorous standards of ex ante appraisal to ensure that the projects 
funded to diversify the economy have good prospects for uccess;19 and fiscal and monetary measures 
to dampen inflationary pressure in sectors like construction. 
3.7 Summary 
• Any move to minerals value-added processing should be taken cautiously, and only after clear 
profitability calculations for each capital investment have been carried out through rigorous 
financial technical and economic analysis (incorporating the social and private benefits and 
costs for the economy). 
• There is potential for high returns in the minerals processing industry but each project should 
be reviewed carefully along with the performance of world markets and the plans of 
competitors. 
• It has to be considered that some processing (e.g. smelting) would only be profitable in the 
long run. A careful market analysis is needed to esabli h whether processed copper and steel 
products produced in Mongolia could be sold in China. 
• Metallurgical industries tend to be male-dominated, which is not consonant with the 
Millennium Development Goal 3 on Promoting Gender Equality and Empowering Women. 
Hence alternative sources of employment need to be sought for female workers. 
• It would make sense to support the four primary processed mineral goods (SITC Rev2: Copper 
and copper alloys, refined or not (6821); Copper and copper alloys, worked (6822); 
Aluminium and aluminium alloys, worked (6842); and, Lead and lead alloys, worked (6852)) 
that Mongolia is already exporting and other activities in the SITC 68 category (non-ferrous 
metals), since these are likely to require similar skill sets and institutional knowledge. 
• Careful management of minerals extraction revenues via, for example, a Sovereign Wealth 
Fund is advisable to support the production of tradable goods, which could provide the foreign 
exchange necessary to diversify the economy and enhance industrialization. 
 
                                                   
19 The “Hotelling rule” to avoid over-exploitation by depleting resources at a rate which equates the reurn on 
mineral-funded investment in other sectors with the real rate of increase in the mineral’s export price is not very 
helpful in situations where mineral export prices are volatile and usually outside the control of indivi ual 
producer economies. 
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4. The Natural Fibres Industry 
4.1 Introduction 
About 36 per cent of Mongolia’s total labour force is engaged in the agricultural sector. Products 
derived from pasturing livestock play an important role in the economy. Out of the natural fibres 
produced by different animals-cashmere, yak hair, sheep’s wool, and camel hair-Mongolian cashmere 
has an outstanding position in world market share. Its annual production of cashmere ranks second in 
the world just after China’s. As with many other raw materials, cashmere prices are volatile, which 
directly affects herders’ incomes.  
Many cashmere processing and garment manufacturing plants have invested in sophisticated de-
hairing, spinning, dyeing, weaving and knitting equipment. The cashmere industry is made up of three 
types of companies, each with its own characteristics, markets and opportunities. The first type 
consists of early-stage processing plants, which procure raw greasy cashmere from herders or traders, 
scour it and produce fine de-haired cashmere for export, mainly to China, Europe and Japan. The 
second type consists of garment manufacturers. Most of them produce sewn garments, and the 
remainder knitted cashmere garments using hand-knitting machines. The third type of cashmere plants 
consists of vertically integrated companies, combining several operations from processing raw 
materials to spinning, dyeing, garment manufacturing a d production of other knitted and woven 
products. Unfortunately, the interests of these thre types of companies do not necessarily coincide. In 
particular, the first two respond to short-term changes in domestic and international trade regimes, 
rather than adopting a long-term perspective on investing in the expansion of the industry in Mongolia. 
The Mongolian cashmere industry-throughout the whole production chain, from the care of the goats 
to the marketing of the final garments-needs to overcome several impediments to its development. The 
following are the most important: i) the quality of the raw fibre; ii) the co-ordination problem, whic 
makes it difficult for herders to enter formal market arrangements with domestic manufacturers, thus 
compounding the lack of technical assistance to enhance breeding techniques20; iii) the quality of the 
water used in dyeing and finishing (the water needs to be very soft); iv) supply of the chemical 
products necessary for the treatment of the fibre; v) inadequate domestic spinning capacity, which 
leads some garment producers to ship raw cashmere to China for spinning, and  to import the yarn for 
manufacturing in Mongolia; and vi) inconsistent yarn quality (it is sometimes mixed with other yarns).  
However, a major issue of concern for domestic producers of cashmere products continues to be the 
quality of the hair, which has been deteriorating.21 Moreover, it is of little use having high-quality raw 
material if promotion of the product is inadequate. The following sections of this chapter will focus on
the improvement of the quality of natural fibres and the importance of marketing of the intermediate 
and final products. 
 
                                                   
20 At present many herders rely on informal contacts wi h traders who buy in bulk by weight at prices often well 
below those in the formal markets in the urban centres. Some of these traders in turn unofficially export the 
cashmere to avoid the export tax.  
21 UNDP (2008) highlighted this issue. 
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4.2 Raw Materials and Textiles  
There are at least four major types of fibres: cotton, wools, cellulosic fibres and synthetic fibres. In 
2009, world fibre production exceeded 70 million tos. World fibre consumption rose by 4.2 per cent; 
man-made fibres consumption rose 4.0 per cent (to 44.1 million tons) and natural fibres consumption 
rose 4.5 per cent (to 26.4 million tons). Synthetic fibres and natural fibres are competing for 
international markets. The natural fibres have advantages that need to be highlighted in order to 
maintain demand for them.  
4.2.1 Raw Materials 
There are four natural fibres produced in Mongolia: cashmere, yak hair, sheep’s wool, and camel hair. 
Each one has particular characteristics and is discussed separately in its international context.  
i) Cashmere 
In the 17 years from 1990 to 2007, world cashmere production increased almost three times, from 
3,953 tons to 9,221 tons. International demand for cashmere remains strong, despite the increased 
selling of low-quality articles. On the fashion side, cashmere continues to be in high demand, which 
should be taken into account as a base for long-term planning of cashmere products. High prices for 
cashmere articles are a result of shortages of raw m terial and growing Chinese demand for sweaters. 
Additionally, the winter of 2009-10 was particularly harsh and a large number of animals died.  
In 2009, Mongolia had almost 42 million head of livestock, of which goats accounted for 46 per cent. 
Related to the increasing number of goats, Mongolia produced 6,700 tons of raw cashmere, accounting 
for about 28 per cent of the total world supply. The number of cashmere goats increased almost 300 
per cent between 1990 and 2009. At the same time, the amount of raw cashmere has increased 4.5 
times (see Table 16). But the increase of cashmere yi ld affected the quality of the fibre adversely due 
to malnourishment of goats. 
Table 16. Number of goats and production of raw cashmere in Mongolia  
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Number of livestock (thousands) 25,857 28,572 30,228 30,398 41,995 
Number of goats (thousands) 5,126 8,521 10,270 13,267 19,465 
Goats in total livestock (%) 20% 30% 34% 44% 46% 
Raw cashmere (tons) 1,500 2,100 3,300 3,760 6,700 
Source: Statistics Yearbook of Mongolia, 1990-2009. 
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In the production of raw cashmere, the following issues should be highlighted. Grading and sorting are 
not undertaken by herders and traders, but by factory employees. The quality of the fibres depends on 
the season, as for any other agricultural commodity. Thus it is necessary to define a set of objective 
parameters to ensure that the quality of the fibre is of the required standard. It would be desirable for 
auctions to be held regularly, and it needs to be inv stigated how to achieve this and ensure that 
herders obtain premium prices for quality cashmere.22  For example, the fibre’s strength is important. 
A long and weak fibre is less good than a shorter and stronger one. The carding operation breaks the 
weak fibre into pieces, leading to low yields and icreased waste. A long and strong fibre is desirable, 
because it gives low wearing propensity in the finished product.  
The minimum strength of the fibre has to be controlled and herders should be rewarded for improving 
the quality of their cashmere by being offered a premium price. So far improvement schemes have 
failed. For instance, UNDP (2008: 63) reports that “[t]he Mongolian Parliament passed a decree in 
May 2008 to commit state subsidies to domestic cashmere processing industries that purchase 
Mongolian raw cashmere from herders for not less than MNT30,000-32,000 (about US$26-28)”. 
Positive effects from the change of policy were expected within three to four years. The problem of 
different white shades can be tackled in a similar w y. Currently manufacturers are bleaching the fibre, 
but even when done carefully damage is visible in the end product.  
Table 17. Exports of cashmere products 
Indicators Unit 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Tons 381 1,676 1,511 1,929 3,558 
Scoured cashmere 
Thousand US $ 13,445 63,065 63,428 77,229 91,209 
Tons 919 1,428 1,785 1,567 1,433 De-haired 
cashmere Thousand US $ 52,794 81,741 114,277 97,614 60,289 
Thousand pieces 492 498 636 689 660 
Finished products 
Thousand US $ 17,551 18,044 13,678 27,740 29,222 
Total exports Thousand US $ 83,790 162,850 191,383 202,583 180,719 
Exports compared 
to previous year 
%  94% 18% 6% -11% 
Source: National Workshop on Cashmere Industry (2009). 
Between 2005 and 2009 exports of low value added cashmere (scoured cashmere) rose sharply in 
terms of both volume and value, growing much more rapidly than exports of finished cashmere goods 
(see Table 17). In the early 1990s there was an export ban on raw cashmere. In 1997 with entry to the 
WTO this was replaced by an export tax, which was widely circumvented by smuggling. Traders 
buying for the Chinese market offered higher prices than domestic processors. The problem is to offer 
herders an adequate price to continue to supply high-quality cashmere while at the same time ensuring 
sufficient supplies reach domestic processors to allow the expansion of the high-quality end of the 
market.  
                                                   
22 A cashmere commodity exchange that brings together herder associations or co-operatives and processors and 
allows the product to be supplied through both long-term contracts and auctions has been recommended (UNDP 
2008: 62). The government appears to be aware of this option and one of the top priority projects listed by the 
National Development and Innovation Committee, an Agricultural Commodity Exchange, aims to create four 
regional wholesale centres where herders and farmers can sell agricultural products and raw materials directly to 
end users. Although the commodity exchange appears to be aimed at a range of products, the project description 
highlights its role in providing an adequate supply of cashmere to domestic processors, so cashmere is clearly the 
main product under the scheme. 
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In 2009 there were over 56 factories with a processing capacity of 7,000 tons of raw cashmere, 4,500 tons of 
de-hairing, 1,120 tons of spinning, 1,200 thousand pieces of knitted cashmere garments, and 350,000 pieces 
of woven garments (Table 18).23  
Table 18. Cashmere processing capacity by company 











Gobi Company 1,000 400 300 458 153 
Buyan Holding 650 500 200 150 0 
MCCWC 450 150 150 200 - 
Mon-Forte LLC 300 300 35 - - 
Eermel LLC 250 150 150 150 150 
Mon-Italy LLC 720 150 -   
Altai Cashmere LLC 240 100 - 50 - 
Sor Cashmere LLC 300 90 70 - - 
Cashmere concept LLC 150 78 35  - 
Tuya Company 300 50 - - - 
Cashmere products LLC    100 - 
Osin LLC 80 50 35  - 
Blue Sky LLC 150 72 35  - 
Sanshiro LLC 75 40 75 - 20 
Erdenet cashmere LLC 100 - 35 - - 
Others 1,500 2,339 - 200 47 
Total  7,000 4,500 1,120 1,200 350 
Source: National Customs Statistics. 
The demand for classic cashmere garments comes from the luxury segments of the European, United 
States and Japanese markets. Strongly influenced by fashion trends, the demand has periodic peaks, 
which is reflected in prices. On the international market, fine de-haired Chinese cashmere sells at a 
higher price than Mongolian cashmere because it has wo technical advantages: i) it is slightly finer (1-
2 microns difference); and ii) it is whiter, and therefore suitable for producing the pastel shades which 
dominate the women’s knitwear market. Mongolian cashmere is used for the lower-value market of 
darker shades. On the other hand, the Mongolian cashmere fibre is 10-15 per cent longer than Chinese 
cashmere (a result of longer harsh winters); has a softer texture that both consumers and spinners 
recognize. Because of these characteristics, Mongolian cashmere is commonly blended with Chinese 
cashmere fibres; the mixture spins better and has an acceptable whiteness. This boosts the desirability 
and price of raw Mongolian cashmere, but also leads to alterations of the mixture, as many spinners 
are tempted to mix Mongolian cashmere with white fin  wool.  
Mongolian cashmere used to have a good international reputation. Its quality, however, has been 
deteriorating due to poor goat nutrition, which affects the fibre’s distinctive characteristics. Table 19 
shows the diameter, length and colour of cashmere fib or Mongolia, China, Australia, Iran and 
Afghanistan. Mongolian cashmere fibre is better than Chinese cashmere in fibre thickness and length, 
but not in colour. The longer the length of cashmere, the better for processing knitted and woven 
products.  
                                                   
23 It is important to highlight that since 2005 the number and volume of production of factories has been falling 
dramatically because of the cancellation of United States preferences for unlimited quantity and China’s entry 
into the WTO. 
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Table 19. Comparison of raw cashmere quality, 2009 
Indicators Mongolia China Australia Iran Afghanistan 
Fibre 
(diameter/microns) 
16.0-16.8 15.6 17.8 17.4 17.3 
Length (mm) 40-45 32-38 21.5-34.7 21.4-38.8 20-23 
Colour 60% / light 100% /white Light/grey Grey Grey 
Source: National Workshop on Cashmere Industry, 2009. 
The finest cashmere comes from the Alashan plateau which stretches through China and Mongolia. 
China has implemented a series of agricultural programmes that provide herdsmen with training on 
improved care for cashmere goats with better nutrients and animal husbandry. They also learn about 
veterinary care, grazing techniques and combing to ensure the production of high-quality cashmere. 
China has conducted scientific research that has proved that healthier cashmere goats produce finer 
and longer cashmere. 
Care and attention must take priority over speed an cost savings in the de-hairing, spinning and 
production processes. Experts at each of these stags must set high standards and be willing to ensure 
that products are reprocessed until they meet them. Quality control is important because a simple 
improvement early in the process can mean a significa t improvement in the final product. 
In the categories of cashmere products exported in 2009 (Table 17), Mongolia only used 15 per cent of 
all obtained raw cashmere for the production of finished products, 34 per cent of raw cashmere was 
used for semi-processing production (de-haired) and 51 per cent was exported to China without value 
added processing. In other words, 85 per cent of Mongolia’s cashmere exports were either scoured or 
de-haired, and only 15 per cent was finished product. By contrast, China exported no unprocessed raw 
cashmere; 68 per cent of all collected raw cashmere was turned into finished products and 32 per cent 
was exported to other countries after semi-processing.  
The Chinese cashmere business has made the leap from exporting the raw material to selling finished 
goods to the most prestigious brands in the fashion w rld. Its lower production costs turned cashmere 
from a luxury item into a mass market, high-street commodity. As China’s main competitor, Mongolia 
should process more of its raw cashmere. For this to happen, Mongolia needs to increase its spinning 
capacity and manufacture its own yarn, rather than importing it from China.  
ii) Sheep’s wool 
Mongolia has about 15 million sheep. The animal is farmed for its meat, wool, skin and milk. 
Mongolian breeds like Bayad, Altaian, Torguud, Darkhan, Uzemchin and Barga are classified by their 
unique characteristics. Three Mongolian scientists created the Orkhon and Yeruu breeds. The average 
weight of a Mongolian sheep is 50 kg and it gives around 1.5 kg of wool; the Orkhon breed weighs 75-
85 kg, gives 7.5 kg of wool and is well-suited to the local climate. Mongolian sheep have adapted to a 
harsh climate and are able to survive drought, heat, shortages of grazing and water, and moving 
location. Other hybrids are unlikely to survive in such conditions. Foreign scientists have praised th 
skills and ability of Mongolian herders in developing such livestock.  
Sheep’s wool is an important basic material for high-quality woollen cloth and carpets. With sheep 
numbers down, global wool production fell in 2008 and 2009 and production is likely to be lower in 
2010, particularly for apparel wool. The International Wool Textile Organization (IWTO) expected 
production to fall by around 2 per cent in the 2009/1  season. Sheep numbers continue to fall in some 
countries, notably Australia and China, as growers shift away from wool to meat production. There is 
also very little stock being held within the grower countries to add to the supply of wool. 
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Apparel wool prices fell sharply in October 2008 as a result of fallout from the global financial crisis. 
Prices reached a low point in February 2009 before recovering a little by the end of the season. Trends 
in the prices for wool used for interior textiles were more mixed in 2008/09, but the overall decline 
was not as significant, in part because prices for interior textiles wool had not risen by as much as 
those for apparel wool in 2007/08. The average price for wool sold in New Zealand actually rose by 2 
per cent in 2008/09, reflecting the relative importance of coarse wool in New Zealand’s clip. 
The larger fall in wool prices in part reflects the fact that they had risen more than those for other 
fibers in 2007/08 and had become less competitive, encouraging processors to use less wool in blends 
with synthetic fibers. This is indicated by the wool t  synthetic and wool to cotton price ratios. The 
wool to synthetic prices ratio peaked at 4.3 in the first quarter of 2008, but had fallen back to 3.1 by 
the second quarter of 2009. Over the same period, the wool to cotton price ratio fell from 5.6 to 4.5. 
Data from the International Trade Centre show that raw wool exports fell sharply in 2008. Exports 
from Australia, the world’s largest exporter, fell by 13 per cent. Raw wool imports also recorded a 
sharp fall in 2008. Global trade in wool yarn, wool woven fabrics and wool apparel (knitwear and in 
men’s and women’s woven wear) also declined in 2008, as a result of both the lower raw wool supply 
and the slowdown in the global economy. The trend continued in 2009 and is likely to have persisted 
in 2010.  
Considering these circumstances, Mongolia needs to explore alternative markets for the quantity and 
quality of wool that it is producing. One option could be to promote Mongolian wool as a natural 
insulation material. 
iii) Camel  
The Bactrian camel has become a symbol of Mongolia. A most two-thirds of its camels are in the Gobi 
region.24 It is an animal which is easy for herders to handle, is very hardy and is highly adapted to the 
desert environment. In the summer the hair is short and thin, and in the winter it grows long and thick, 
protecting the camels from the cold. Animals can be 3 metres high, weigh up to 700 kg and live as 
long as 40 years. They are important for herders as a source of milk, wool and transport – both for 
riding and to carry heavy loads when the herder family oves camp. The number of camels in 
Mongolia has declined dramatically in the past decas. In 2010 there were about 255,000 camels, 
which produce an estimated 700 tons of “female” wool a year.25 
The international camel hair market is a solid niche market within the animal hair sector. Significant 
supplier countries of camel hair are: Mongolia, Iran, Afghanistan, Russia, China and Australia. The 
fine fur of camel hair is often blended with fine wool to create fabrics for men's and women's coats, 
jackets and blazers, skirts, sweaters, gloves, scarves, mufflers, caps and robes. The long coarser hair 
removed in the de-hairing process is also used for blankets, carpet backing and waterproof coats. 
                                                   
24 Camels also play a vital role in the management of the Gobi. They forage on a type of shrub called saxaul 
(Haloxylon ammondendron), especially in the winter, and help maintain saxaul forests by spreading their seeds. 
Saxaul forests protect the soil from erosion, shelter o her plant species from the biting wind, and help to retain 
moisture in the soil and air. However, saxaul wood is also a major source of fuel. Protecting and resto ing saxaul 
forests is an important strategy to combat desertifica on. 
25 Government policy seeks to increase camel numbers y rewarding herders for larger herds and supporting 
exhibitions of camel products. The Gurvantes district government pays herders MNT1.000 (about US$0.70) for 
each new-born camel calf.  
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There are five steps involved in the production of camel hair products: collection, sorting, de-hairing, 
spinning and weaving or knitting. After collecting the hair either through shearing or during the 
moulting season, it goes through a sorting process, separating the coarse hair from the fine and soft 
hair. The fibres are washed to remove any dirt or debris and the sorted and washed hair is then de-
haired. This process removes the coarse hair and any andruff or vegetable matter before it is sent to 
be spun into yarn and used for either weaving or knitting. 
The quality of wool is determined by the age and sex of the camel. Mongolian herders distinguish 
“male” and “female” wool. The male wool is made up of longer, coarser hair; it comes from the mane, 
the front of the neck, the knee and the tops of the humps. Most is used to make ropes and animal 
halters. The long neck hair is used to make thread, an  hair from the mane is used to make bags and as 
insulation in traditional quilted jackets. A camel yields about 1.5 kg of male wool a year. The finer 
wool, female, is from the rest of the body. A camel yi lds about 3.5 kg of female wool a year. The 
finest and most valuable is called torom wool and comes from baby camels less than three years old. 
The older a camel gets the less female fibre it has; 80 per cent of the wool from an adult camel is fine 
hair with a diameter of 17–20 microns. 
The three biggest companies in Ulaanbaatar together process less than half of Mongolia’s camel wool– 
about 310 tons a year. It appears that up to half of the raw wool suitable for making yarn and garments 
is not processed in Mongolia; it is either stored or smuggled over the border to Chinese factories. 
Among the many problems that the camel hair industry faces are: lack of organization; the nomadic 
lifestyle of herders, long distances, high costs of travel and communication, a lack of infrastructure, as 
well as limited understanding of cooperation mechanisms; lack of export skills; inconsistent demand 
from traders; and lack of capital and credit. 
With assistance from the European Union, the Mongolian government has established “Gobi desert 
camel wool” as a “geographical indication” – a kind of trademark that guarantees the origin of the 
wool (UNDP, 2008). This certification requires that ll processing steps are done in Mongolia. 
Registered producers can use the geographical indication logo as well as their own trademarks. 
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iv) Yak  
Yaks are an indispensable part of animal husbandry i  the high mountain regions where they are used 
both for transport and for their productive capabilities. In recent years, the textile industry has greatly 
increased its demand for yak fibre. The yak has a high degree of adaptation to the ecosystem. No other 
domestic animal can feed on the vegetation growing at 2,000-4,000 metres, in territory marked by 
steep, treacherous slopes, moorland, bogs and lakes. The morphological and physiological 
characteristics of the yak endow it with an ability to resist cold, to scrape through snow for fodder and
to graze very short grass. 
Though there is increasing demand for yak wool, Mongolian authorities have not done enough to 
improve the procurement system. Herders are not aware of the techniques of yak wool combing and 
sorting, and the majority use it for making household items (e.g. ropes).  
Domestic processing factories have started producing h gh-quality products for both domestic and 
foreign markets. This has raised the demand for yak wool, but the supply has been relatively low. The 
international yak market is expected to have a bright future, because the wool is seen as an exotic fibre
and fits into the recent revival of natural fibres. The fashion industry is looking for new and innovati e 
fibres, with the potential for higher margins. The b st example of this kind of development is vicuna 
fibre, sourced mainly in Peru. The demand for other exotic fibres, such as mohair and alpaca, is also 
increasing. Yak wool, which is warmer than sheep wool, might be the next natural fibre to be taken up 
by fashion designers.26 The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has run tests showing that yak 
wool is stronger but as thin and fine as merino wool.  
4.2.2 Textiles 
The textile industry accounts for 23 per cent of Mong lia’s manufacturing sector. Mongolia should 
identify and target niche markets built on demand for natural fibres. The authentic design (i.e. 
Mongolian patterns) of the clothes it produces plays  crucial role. Also, garments with the traditional 
nomadic style (i.e. customs) need to be developed. Establishing its own style is crucial to position 
Mongolian natural fibre products in the international market.  
Apart from garments, natural fibres could be used in other products, like carpets, felting, insulation 
material, etc. For example, there are two major carpet producers (one in Ulaanbaatar and one in 
Erdenet) and several blanket producers. Their production capacity for scouring, spinning, knitting, 
weaving and felt making is far in excess of current production. There is a potentially large market for 
machine-made carpets, especially in China, but also in other countries which are currently supplied by 
Belgium, Turkey and Egypt. In addition, there is a potentially large demand for hand-woven carpets 
presently supplied by Nepal, Pakistan and others.  
4.3 Prospects for the Industry 
Mongolia’s natural fibres industry has the potential to gain a niche in the international market. In fact, 
there are already Mongolian companies which are developing the capacity to compete in the 
international market (see Appendix 1 for a list of the main companies). New companies require initial 
support from the government, such as preferential loans, temporary tax benefits, access to state-of-the-
art manufacturing techniques, designs, machinery and materials required in the production process of 
natural fibres products, access to markets information, etc.  
                                                   
26 Yak wool is gently brushed off rather than sheared (placating animal rights activists). 
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In order for Mongolia’s manufactured products to be competitive they need testing laboratories, 
equipment and labour that meet international standards.  Government as well as the industry sector 
itself has to create and maintain such primary testing facilities, ensuring that they are in outstanding 
condition and fully equipped. They must be recognized by and registered with the relevant 
international bodies and agencies in order to assure international compliance. The laboratories need to 
be equipped at least with a scanning electron microscope, which is a standard device for differentiating 
cashmere fibre from other fibres.  
Mongolian national research institutes contribute to the improvement of the quality of the industry. 
Although there are good institutes (e.g. the Textil Research Institute), they do not have the necessary 
level of expertise to do industry research. Currently, machines and instruments have to be bought to 
comply with current international standards. The institutes are also part of international networks and
associations. The institutes are mostly or partially public owned, but their funding is insufficient. The 
Mongolian government needs to assure them of financal support.  
Once the quality of the raw material is ensured, production of goods produced using natural fibres 
could be increased if the laborious cleaning and de-hairing process was mechanized. Women could 
continue to hand-spin at home. The possibility of establishing regional cooperatives could be 
examined. Marketing is the key to the future strategy for the Mongolian animal hair and textile 
industry. The following scenario concentrates on cashmere, but could also be applied to the other 
fibres, especially yak.27  
As a long-term strategy, Mongolian cashmere has to create its own identity. Competition from Chinese 
cashmere producers and manufacturers will continue and become stronger, meaning that Mongolian 
cashmere will need its own identity to market it. A marketing concept has to be developed by an 
international marketing authority. The logo used to pr mote the products is of great importance, for 
example “Mongolian Cashmere Mark”. Such a concept was tried some years ago, but without the 
necessary support from the whole industry and governm nt bodies, so it did not bear fruit.  
Mongolian natural fibres need an own-identity relatd o the country itself. The country is already 
associated with the natural fibres products. There is already a proposed slogan “Cashmere of 
Mongolia” to promote the image of the local industry. However, the brand requires a slogan to be 
advertised internationally, and a set of technical requirements which can be met only by Mongolian 
cashmere. A suggested slogan is “Mongolia–the Cashmere Country”.  
Erdenet, a carpet company, is a good example of what can be done. It is already participating in 
international trade fairs and positioning its name. The firm has applied for the Woolmark licence, 
which will give it more authority to claim its own brand. In contrast, domestic cashmere garment 
producers are still at the stage of developing their own branding, marketing and distribution channels 
and a niche luxury market, on their own or with partne s. 
The industry needs to be innovative. The products have to be distinctive and unique. To achieve this, 
the industry requires professional designers, trained in high-quality design schools and academies 
where designers can become acquainted with fashion trends in high-income countries. Consequently, 
the government and industry have jointly to support the start-up of such institutions (e.g. an 
International Chinggis Cashmere Design Institute). Private initiatives in the form of joint-ventures and 
the assistance of international development agencies are also options to be considered.  
                                                   
27 A recent publication by UNIDO (2010) provides useful guidance on adding value to traditional products of 
regional origin. 
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4.4 Summary 
• Mongolia needs to find a way of bringing herders and manufacturers of natural fibres together. 
Communication between the two is fundamental to the understanding of the need to improve 
the quality of the raw material. 
• Quality assurance has to be taken into account, as qu lity is the base of all the other suggested 
initiatives. Without guaranteeing a certain quality s andard, the marketing measures will not 
work. The best way of improving cashmere quality is empowering the herders. Quality 
improvement and monitoring measures require improved infrastructure and high-class 
equipment for the national public testing laboratories 
• Production of natural fibre products could be increased if the laborious cleaning and de-hairing 
processes were mechanized, although women could continue to hand-spin at home. The 
possibility of establishing regional cooperatives could be examined. 
• Mongolia has to market and brand its products (and itself) strongly. Its unique environmental 
terrain, and traditional ambience and heritage give it a perfect base for “co-branding” all 
Mongolian products, both raw material and added-value products.  
• The Marketing Strategy Approach has to be accompanied by a series of measures involving 
government and industry, to give support to producers of natural fibres products, through 
investing in infrastructure, establishing design schools, and equipping high-class testing 
laboratories and research institutes. 
• A leading design institute for cashmere needs to be created in Mongolia. (e. g. an International 
Chinggis Cashmere Design Institute). 
• A series of marketing measures needs to be executed, such as having stands/show cases at 
international fashion exhibitions (Premiere Vision/Texworld, Heimtextil fair, etc.); working 
with celebrities from Mongolia e.g. Galsan Tschinag; inviting fashion designers to Mongolia; 
and organizing a cashmere conference in Mongolia. 
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Appendix 1. Main natural fibre companies 
Carpets Knits (including knitted fabric) 
Erdet Carpet Corporation Buyan LLC 
Ulaanbaatar Carpets JSC Eermel Shareholding Co. 
 Erdenet Cashmere Co. Ltd. 
Commission spinners Gobi Corporation 
Buyan LLC Sun Shiroh Co. Ltd. 
 Western Sources Co., Bridge Group 
Consultancy services Laboratory and testingservices 
Mongolian Textile Institute Mongolian Textile Institute 
 T. Noosimpex Co. Ltd. 
Dehairers of cashmere/camel-hair Merchants (wool) 
Buyan LLC  Buyan LLC 
Cashmerefine Asia Co. Ltd.  Cashmerefine Asia Co. Ltd. 
Chono Corporation Chono Corporation 
Eermel Shareholding Co.  Erdenet Cashmere Co. Ltd. 
Erdent Cashmere Co.  Mongol Nekhmel (Montex) Co. 
Buyan LLC  Monseal Co. Ltd. 
Erdenet Carpet Corporation  T. Noosimpex Co. Ltd. 
Gobi Corporation  Unitra Co. Ltd. 
Mongol Cashmere & Camel Co. 
Mongol Nekhmel (Montex) Co.  Merchants (yarn) 
Monital Cashmere Co. Ltd.  Eermel Shareholding Co. 
Novanooluur LLC  Erdenet Carpet Corporation 
Sor Cashmere Co, Ltd  Erdenet Cashmere Co. Ltd. 
Sun Shiroh Co. Ltd.  Mongol Nekhmel (Montex) Co. 
T & I JVC Sun Shiroh Co. Ltd. 
T. Noosimpex Co. Ltd. 
Tuya Co. Ltd.  Other fibre producers 
Unitra Co. Ltd. Erdenet Cashmere Co. Ltd. 
Western Sources Co., Bridge Group 
  Reclaimed/recycled textiles and textile waste 
Dyers (commission and/or on own account) Gobi Corporation 
Buyan LLC 
Erdenet Carpet Corporation  Scourers, carbonisers and blenders 
Sun Shiroh Co. Ltd.  Buyan LLC 
Buyan LLC  Eermel Shareholding Co. 
Eermel Shareholding Co.  Erdenet Cashmere Co. Ltd. 
Erdenet Carpet Corporation  Gobi Corporation 
Gobi Corporation  Mongol Nekhmel (Montex) Co. 
Sun Shiroh Co. Ltd.  Sun Shiroh Co. Ltd. 
Ulaanbaatar Carpets JSC Tuya Co. Ltd. 
 
Finishers (commission and/or on own account) Spinners (semi-worsted) 
Buyan LLC  Eermel Shareholding Co. 
Eermel Shareholding Co.  Gobi Corporation 
Erdenet Cashmere Co. Ltd.  Spinners (woollen) 
Gobi Corporation  Buyan LLC 
  Eermel Shareholding Co. 
Garment manufacturers  Erdenet Carpet Corporation 
Buyan LLC  Gobi Corporation 
Eermel Shareholding Co.  Mongol Nekhmel (Montex) Co.
Erdenet Cashmere Co. Ltd.  Sun Shiroh Co. Ltd. 
Ezlo Foradori LLC  Ulaanbaatar Carpets JSC 
Gobi Corporation 
Khatan Suljee Co. Ltd.  Spinner (worsted) 
Mongol Cashmere & Camel Co.  Gobi Corporation 
Sun Shiroh Co. Ltd. 
Western Sources Co., Bridge Group 
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Textile education/courses  Weavers (labels) 
Mongolian Textile Institute  Sun Shiroh Co. Ltd. 
 
Technical textiles (wool)  Weavers (woollen) 
Unitra Co. Ltd.  Eermel Shareholding Co. 
  Erdenet Cashmere Co. Ltd. 
Topmakers and combers (commission)  Gobi Corporation 
Cashmerefine Asia Co. Ltd.  Mongol Cashmere & Camel Co. 
Gobi Corporation  Sun Shiroh Co. Ltd. 
Mongol Nekhmel (Montex) Co. 
 
Topmakers and combers (on own account)  Weavers (wor ted) 
Gobi Corporation  Erdenet Cashmere Co. Ltd. 
Mongol Nekhmel (Montex) Co.  Gobi Corporation 
 
Trade associations  Wool felts 
Ministry of Industry and Trade  Erdenet Carpet Corporation 
Mongolian Fibremark Society  Esgi, Esgi Gutal Co. Ltd. 
  Mon-Es Co. Ltd. 
Transport services/shippers/couriers 
International Freight Forwarding Centre of Mongolian Railways (IFFC) 
Mongol Trans Co. Ltd. 
Mongolian Express Co. Ltd. 
MMT – Mongolian Transport Team Co. Ltd. 
Tuushin International Freight Forwarders 
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5. The Red Meat Processing Industry 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the current state of the red meat industry in Mongolia and suggests changes that 
need to be made in the organization of the industry, management of animals on farms and along the 
processing system. It emphasizes that the Mongolian meat industry needs to move away from being 
almost entirely “production-focused” to become “consumer-focused”. 
Mongolia is in competition with a number of meat exporting countries that over the past 50 years have 
developed meat industries that comply with international meat trading standards for product 
management in hygiene, processing, packaging and presentation. In order to become internationally 
competitive, Mongolia must emulate the meat processing ystems of competing countries and follow 
international safety standards. According to experts, the Australian meat industry is the best model for 
Mongolia to study, as there are many similarities btween the two countries. The developmental stages 
through which Mongolia must pass in order to compete in international meat markets have been 
traversed by other countries which are now well-positioned in international markets. As the general 
level of profitability, hygiene, management and redmeat production efficiency at which the 
Mongolian industry is operating is currently very low by world standards, it is expected that it 
will take Mongolia many years to become competitive in international markets. 
The Mongolian meat industry is a meat production and selling system and not an integrated meat 
industry of the kind normally seen in international marketing systems. Compared with major meat-
exporting countries, Mongolia has a non-integrated, segmented supply chain, with no co-ordinated 
strategy. Businesses along the Mongolian meat supply chain appear to consider their individual 
interests only and not the interests of the whole supply chain. Nor is the Mongolian Herders 
Association representative of all herders although, with the assistance of the Green Gold initiative of 
the Swiss Development Corporation, its influence is apparently growing.  Not all herders contribute 
financially to this Association and therefore they do not consider it a representative organisation.  
The Mongolian Government has enacted many resolutions f r the meat industry, but these are “top 
down” dictates and not necessarily accepted by the w ole industry. Most of measures needed to 
improve the Mongolian meat industry have been proposed by national and international specialists 
over the past 20 years. However, the one issue that has not been adequately addressed is the 
development of a cohesive, self-reliant, world standard industry, which operates independently of, but 
in partnership with, the Government. The private sector must form associations, share information and 
work collectively to make the industry consumer-focused and thus successful (van Gelder, 2010).  
The Mongolian population consumes approximately 85-95 per cent of all meat produced in the 
country. Most of this meat comes from animals slaughtered outside the abattoir system. The 
Mongolian population prefers to prepare meat by tradi ional wet-cooking methods. By international 
food preparation standards, such cooking methods are uncomplicated and do not demand 
differentiation of meat on the basis of tenderness, colour, age, sex, fat marbling, etc. All cuts of the 
animal carcass are sold for the same price, or for very slight price differences, and there is no 
consumer demand or pressure for price differentials.. This has translated into a single price per kg paid 
to herders for animals of different quality. Herders increase their incomes either by selling more or 
bigger animals. They do not pay attention to animal quality, based on objective, measured 
specifications, as occurs in developed international meat trading nations.  
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The Mongolian constitution states that the land belongs to the State, so the herders cannot own, or 
lease, the land on which they graze their animals. Herders increase their livestock numbers in order to 
survive economically. This has led to 71 per cent of the land being subject to some form of 
degradation and desertification and a lack of meat producing ability in Mongolian animals. In order to 
improve the herders’ husbandry, a marketing and ownership system that leads them towards increased 
profits must be created.  Van Gelder and Erdenebaatar (2007) comment that: 
“It seems that the problems in Mongolia are that herders are concentrating on least-cost inputs 
and do not have any understanding of the possible production benefits that may accrue from 
high quality production methodologies (such as the us of veterinary services and vaccines, 
drenches, dips etc.), because they have not had the opportunity to see what can be done, or have 
it explained to them. There is no information exchange, no media advertising and no 
encouragement. The changers [traders] are the people who spread information to the herders and 
they naturally will spread information that serves their individual commercial purposes and this 
has certainly not been to the long-term benefit of M ngolia.” 
5.2 World Meat Market Situation and Mongolia’s Supply Capacity  
Mongolia currently faces a problem of overproduction f meat due to an increase in the domestic 
animal population. The effect of the 2009-2010 dzud (a Mongolian term for an extremely cold winter 
when large numbers of livestock die from starvation)  meat production has not been fully assessed. 
The Mongolian Meat Association estimates that the maxi um amount of meat Mongolia may have to 
export in 2010 is 111,400 tons, made up of 89,000 tons of goat meat (largely from older male and male 
castrate goats), 10,000 tons of horse meat, 10,000 tons of beef and 2,400 tons of sheep meat. The pric
for exported Mongolian meat is about US$1.00/kg, which is three to four times lower than the price 
received by Australian meat exporters, depending on the type of meat (e.g. goat, beef, mutton, etc.). 
According to world meat trading estimates by the FAO this amount of meat should easily be absorbed 
into the world trading system. However, there are production difficulties and food safety issues to be 
resolved before export of meat can be successfully engaged in. 
According to the latest available estimates for 2010 by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), 
world production of meat will be approximately 283 million tons. Mongolia’s contribution to world 
meat exports is very small (0.5 per cent). 
The top ten producers of bovine meat are China, the United States, Brazil, India, Russia, Canada, 
Argentina, Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea. However, the ranking of the countries changes 
when exports are taken into account. The top ten exporters are the United States, Brazil, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, China, Argentina, India, Republic of Korea and Ukraine (see Table 20).  
China, India and Australia are the top three producers of sheep and goat meat; while New Zealand, 
Australia and Mongolia are the top three exporters.  
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Table 20. World meat estimates for 2010 








World 282,600,000 282,500,000 21,331,700 21,386,400 
Mongolia 334,400 223,000 unknown 114,400 
Bovine meat 
World 67,700,000 67,700,000 6,677,400 6,679,200 
United States  12,000,000 12,000,000 1,250,000 1,298,000 
Western Europe  8,500,000 8,100,000 417,000 792,300 
Brazil  8,400,000 7,500,000 66,300 916,000 
China Mainland 7,300,000 7,300,000 0 25,300 
Africa  4,600,000 4,900,000 353,700 78,600 
India  3,500,000 3,100,000 200 347,700 
Argentina  2,900,000 2,600,000 22,300 318,800 
Australia  2,000,000 900,000 4,500 1,122,900 
Russian Federation  1,900,000 2,700,000 860,900 4,700 
Canada  1,300,000 1,100,000 269,000 556,100 
Ukraine  900,000 800,000 1,500 137,200 
New Zealand  700,000 200,000 6,700 495,400 
Japan  500,000 1,600,000 1,106,300 700 
Kazakhstan  400,000 300,000 6,500 17,400 
Republic of Korea 300,000 600,000 391,200 1,200 
Mongolia (Cattle, Horse, Camel) 84,400 64,400 unknown 20,000 
        Sheep and goat meat 
World 13,700,000 13,700,000 833,900 834,200 
China Mainland 3,500,000 800,000 1,700 0 
Africa 2,200,000 2,200,000 27,300 18,800 
Western Europe  1,100,000 1,400,000 240,100 5,200 
India  800,000 800,000 0 18,400 
Australia  700,000 400,000 300,000 338,400 
New Zealand  600,000 200,000 3,200 381,200 
Russian Federation  200,000 200,000 10,000 100 
Mongolia  138,600 47,200 unknown 91,400 
Argentina  100,000 100,000 600 1,400 
Brazil  100,000 100,000 5,400 100 
United States  100,000 200,000 80,200 2,700 
Kazakhstan  100,000 100,00 0 2,000 
 Republic of Korea 0 0 11,200 3,000 
Canada  0 0 16,100 400 
Japan  0 0 37,100 0 
Ukraine  0 0 1,900 300 
Source: FAO. 
Mongolia has to assess its meat production capability and the characteristics of its meat. Mongolia 
produces fat-tailed or fat-rumped sheep which Australia and New Zealand do not. This automatically 
gives Mongolia an advantage in countries which prefer fat-rumped sheep, for example countries in the 
Middle East.  
Mongolian exports of meat are largely to long-term t aditional markets in Russia, with minor trade in 
meat or live animals to some Middle Eastern countries, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. The 
monetary value of Mongolian meat exports is currently small (approximately 1.3 per cent of GDP in 
2009).  
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5.3 The Mongolian Meat Processing Industry 
The Mongolian meat industry is seeking to enter the int rnational meat trade and to add value to its 
meat through processing it. Adding value to meat, as seen in meat exporting, is mainly through 
sectioning and packaging the animal carcass into individual cuts which suit the needs of retailers.28 
This requires a number of co-ordinated activities bginning with animal production and ending with 
delivery of the final product to the final consumer.  
On the farm or in the pasture/rangeland, it is important to stimulate a continual increase in animal 
production through improved animal genetics, feeding regimes, health procedures and animal welfare. 
These activities must become accepted as “Codes of Practice” applied by all animal producers/herders. 
It is imperative that a trace-back system for each animal, or group of animals from one farm or area, is 
implemented, so that problems further along the market supply chain can (if necessary) be traced back 
to the individual farm or herder. This is within Mongolia’s capability, but objective judgements will 
have to be made about all components of the current m at supply chain from on-farm production to 
handling, transport, animal slaughter, selling and marketing systems.  
While Mongolian and international specialists have made many useful proposals to improve the 
industry over the past 20 years, the one issue that has not been adequately addressed is the 
development of a cohesive, self-reliant meat industry, which operates independently of, but in 
partnership with, the Government, as in successful meat-exporting countries. In this regard, the 
Mongolian Government should consider passing legislation granting land rights to herders. A form of 
land rights for individual herders or associations f herders based on regions of common usage would 
modernize the herding industry.  
5.3.1 The Mongolian Meat Market and Production 
The domestic meat market is the controlling factor for Mongolian meat production. Mongolians prefer 
traditionally killed meat, and due to its limited spending power the Mongolian population places 
downward pressure on meat prices changes. Between 85 per cent and 95 per cent of Mongolia’s 
annual meat production is consumed domestically.  
Red meat in Mongolia is produced from sheep, goats, c ttle, yak, horses and camels. There has been a 
dramatic increase in goat numbers in comparison with other livestock, although overall livestock 
numbers have doubled since 1985. Some commentators suggest that the increase in animal numbers is 
an indication of the success of the market economy concept.  Many other commentators express 
concern that the country is not capable of supporting this number of livestock, when the long winters, 
the very short plant growing season and the need to produce animal products (meat and fibre) that will 
be acceptable in both the international and domestic markets are all taken into account. 
Technical studies need to be made of: (i) pasture production capability in the various ecological 
regions of Mongolia, to support animals based on the 100-120 day pasture plant growing season; (ii) 
the number and distribution of watering points to service the animals; (iii) the availability of winter-
saved pasture and hay to service animal requirements in he periodic and inevitable dzud, which 
naturally occur in cycles of approximately 10-12 years.  
Mongolia’s total annual meat production in 2009 was approximately 245,000 tons from the slaughter 
of 8.2 million livestock. Domestic consumption is approximately 229,000 tons (Enkh-Amgalan, 2010). 
                                                   
28 Adding value for the domestic market in developed economies takes the following forms: adding extra 
ingredients to the raw meat; cooking the raw meat bfore sale, as with pre-cooked roasts; processing meat into 
small goods; prepared sausages; packaging meat for  longer shelf life. 
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Table 21 provides the production figures for beef, horse, sheep mutton, goat and camel. In 2009, 
approximately 10,000-20,000 tons of meat were exported to Russia and about 241 tons to the Middle 
East, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Exports of meat are projected to increase in coming years, 
presumably to the Middle East. 20,000 tons of sheep m at and 20,000 tons goat meat are expected to 
be exported through Tianjin in China, which is the closest port to land-locked Mongolia. It is planned 
to establish a 3,000 ton, cold-storage facility in Tianjin. However, it will be necessary for the 
Mongolian Government to negotiate with the Chinese Government for this to take place.  
Table 21. Livestock numbers in various years and recent meat production 
 1985 1989 1999 2007 2009 
Total Number of Livestock 22,485,500 24,674,900 33,568,900 40,263,800 43,657,100 
Livestock Consumed for meat 7,323,200 7,583,500 8,743,900 7,012,600 8,285,200 
Total Meat Production (tons) 225,900 239,600 289,000 223,100 245,000 
   Beef 68,100 72,800 104,600 46,600 60,000 
   Horse 29,500   29,000 38,000 
   Sheep mutton 96,900 68,400 97,000 
   Goat 19,300 
121,900 128,900 
38,600 50,000 
   Camel 9,700   5,300  
Meat Processed through Abattoirs (tons) 62,500 61,700 4,300 6,800 18,300 
Exported Meat (tons) 36,800 30,500 15,000 10,900 16,050 
Source: Mongolian Statistical Handbook; Mongolian Meat Association (2010). 
Box 7 lists the distinctive characteristics of the red meat industry in Mongolia. 
Box 7. Distinctive characteristics of the red meat industry in Mongolia 
 
• The population consumes 85-95 per cent of annual met production. 
• The average meat consumption of the population has been approximately 75-85 kg/per 
 capita/year, which is among the highest in the world. 
• Cooking methods traditionally employed do not stimulate price differentials for different parts 
 of meat carcasses, thus reducing the possibility of value adding in the domestic market. 
• Unofficially meat prices have been kept as low as po sible, particularly in the spring, so all 
 Mongolian people can purchase sufficient meat for household consumption. 
• The profit margins in the Mongolian meat supply chain re not sufficient to allow any 
 traders/abattoirs to invest in infrastructure improvements. 
• The cost of developmental and operational finance for businesses makes borrowing for 
 infrastructural improvements along the meat market supply chain uneconomic. 
• Herders do not have funds to invest in animal improvements, health or feed, so animals are 
 dependent almost solely on seasonal pasture. 
 
The Mongolian Government approved the National Programme on Food Security by Resolution 
No.32, February 2009. Phase 1 of this programme is to be implemented between 2009 and 2012, and 
Phase 2 will be undertaken in 2013 to 2016. This programme is intended to: i) formulate and 
implement a meat sub-programme of support to intensifi d meat farms, meat processing facilities and 
meat exporters; ii) establish comprehensive agriculture and food production complexes, which comply 
with international standards; and iii) increase exports by producing healthy and safe meat and meat 
products and improving processing to meet internatio l standards, i.e. applying HACCP (a quality 
assurance programme) and international standards such as ISO9001, ISO22000:207 in meat 
processing.  
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At present Mongolia has 32 abattoirs, principally located in the north. Most of these abattoirs were 
built during the command economy period, with assistance from Russia, East and West Germany, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Yugoslavia, and are of old design. 
Together the abattoirs have an annual slaughter capacity of 85,000 tons of meat, and cold storage 
capacity of 42,000 tons. After transition to the market economy in the 1989-1991 period, privatization 
was undertaken, but difficulties arose. Lack of capital and operational finance forced the closure of 
many of the abattoirs.  
The European Union Animal Health and Livestock Marketing Project (Leach et al, 2008; European 
Union, 2007) is addressing the issue of abattoir capability in supplying international markets and also 
the hygiene standards for supplying the domestic meat market. Some older abattoirs have been 
renovated and a small number of new ones have been established. The new abattoirs are privately-
owned and have targeted specific markets, particularly the Republic of Korea.  
Table 22 summarizes the total amount of meat produced in selected years, killed in small and large 
abattoirs, killed in non-abattoir locations, consumed domestically and exported.29 Traditionally the 
majority of meat consumed in Mongolia has come from meat killed through non-abattoir processes. 
Since the mid-1990s there has been an increasing proportion of meat coming through non-controlled 
processes; animal health treatments are virtually unused by herders. 
Table 22. Meat production and consumption in Mongolia (thousand tons) 
Item 1989 1999 2009 
Total Meat Production Mongolia 239.6 289.0 245.0 
Slaughtered in Abattoirs 







Slaughtered by non-abattoir processes 







Domestic Meat Consumption 







Total Meat Exported 







Note:  *Preliminary figures.  
Source: van Gelder (2010: Table 8). 
To bring about change, whether to improve the quality of meat for domestic consumers or to break 
into international market niches, the Mongolian meat industry will have to improve the way it 
operates.  
                                                   
29 Appendix 2 lists the operational abattoirs in Monglia and indicates that the major player in the Mongolian 
domestic and international trading scene is the Just Group LLC, with approximately 30-50 per cent of production 
capacity. 
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5.3.2 The Quality of Red Meat 
Many studies have been undertaken of herders and their livelihoods. However, virtually no studies 
have been done on farm management costs and returns applicable to herder activities (Bat-Erdene, 
2004). Until full trials have been carried out, using adequate quality supplementary feedstuffs, it is
difficult to gauge whether Mongolian animals could satisfy quality specifications for meat to compete 
on international markets. 
Currently there are concerns about the fact that Mongolia has approximately 45 million head of 
livestock. Emergency measures are being undertaken to allocate an adequate emergency store of 
variable quality fodder (mostly high crude fibre/low crude protein) to starving animals. The increase in 
animal numbers has come mainly from a vast increase in the goat population, due to the herders’ quest 
for increased incomes from goat fibre.30 The number of large animals (cattle, camel, horse and yak) 
has remained low since the 1999-2000 dzud (Leach et al., 2008; European Union, 2007). 
Meat production by any animal depends on a number of factors: the genetics and selection of the 
animal; the nutritional environment to which the animal is exposed―in Mongolia there is only one 
period of the year (usually mid-summer and early-autumn) when pasture feed is usually abundant, 
therefore the main selling and slaughter season is from September to December/January; climate 
stresses (of heat and cold); the animal experiences; and the disease and parasitic burdens the animal 
may carry. In intensive animal production the psychic reaction of an animal to its surroundings may 
also have a bearing on the animal’s production through overcrowding.  
5.4 The Mongolian Meat Processing Industry  
5.4.1 Meat Pricing in the Domestic Market  
A major disincentive for change for herders in Monglia over the past 20 years has been the single 
price paid for meat from red meat producing animals; for example, a fat cow will receive 
approximately the same price per kg live-weight as a lean one. Mongolian herders do not perceive that 
there is any profit from contributing increased labour, managerial effort and production costs to 
produce meat animals that are of superior specifications and which may suit higher-priced 
international markets. International markets pay premium prices for different muscle bundles from 
different positions on the carcass. The price per kg can also vary depending on the type of cooking 
methods to be used. If meat is minced, heavily steamed or deep-fried, there may not be much 
difference between the different muscles. However, when western methods of cooking are applied the 
quality specification differences in muscles make a difference. It is for this difference that varying 
prices are paid for different cuts of meat in interational markets. 
One way to differentiate prices paid for meat products in Mongolia is to establish a number of animal 
feedlots (preferably for beef cattle) for intensive animal feeding. The meat products produced in these 
feedlots, if modern feeding and breeding methods are implemented according to international animal-
feeding and husbandry standards, should be promoted t  the hotel and restaurant trade in Ulaanbaatar 
and other major Mongolian cities, as well as to expatriates working in mining. It is in these niche 
markets that people will be willing to pay extra for quality. Once price differentials are achieved, the
news will quickly spread. Herders are sure to begin to follow the pattern of development and change 
will occur. 
                                                   
30 A major concern for international observers, environmentalists and no doubt the Mongolian Government has 
been the extreme build up in total numbers of the Mongolian national herd. Considerable commentary has been 
given to the carrying capacity of Mongolian pastures, but it has concentrated on the possibility of increasing 
desertification and the environmental destruction of flora and native fauna. 
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5.4.2 Market Price Comparisons for Meat in Mongolia and Australia 
 Mongolian international traders have to seize the opportunity to create price differentials and 
encourage product differentiation by herders to satisfy different consumers, in order to open 
international niche markets. This section compares th  price of red meat in Mongolia and Australia. 
Australia has been chosen as a comparator due to common characteristics of the two countries: dry 
climates in both countries have created herding industries based on domestic ruminant animals; both 
countries are becoming dependent on mining; and both c untries have relatively small populations 
However, Australia exports red meat to over 100 international destinations; it is already well-
positioned in international markets. Production andprocessing systems have been carefully developed 
to ensure that all international customers are satisfied. Therefore, Australia is possibly the main 
competitor that Mongolia faces as it tries to enter th  international higher-value meat market.  
Mongolian meat traders make small profits. The only wa  in which a trader can increase profits, based 
on the current meat industry system, is to gain a bigger share of the market. However, the herders are 
spread across Mongolia and the road transport system i  not well developed for collecting and moving 
livestock or meat over long distances in a fast andefficient manner. Modern refrigerated trucks, 
capable of hygienically transporting a perishable product, such as meat, are not in evidence. 
Table 23 indicates that the margin per kg for both beef and mutton carcasses, between the wholesale 
and retail prices, is on average MNT 1,050-1,200/kg (approximately US$ 0.80). However, this does 
not include costs associated with transport, slaughter, wholesaling of the meat, or paying financial 
interest charges on operational business costs, or capital investment costs. The estimated profits are 
certainly not sufficient to allow traders, or trading companies, to borrow money to invest in industry 
improvements. 

























Beef 181-250(215) 550 118,250 84.46 1,100 2,300 1,200 
  251-320(285) 650 185,250 132.32 1,250 2,300 1,050 
  321 plus(340) 700 238,000 170.00 1,296 2,300 1,004 
Sheep 40-49(45) 550 24,750 17.68 1,146 2,300 1,154 
  50 plus(55) 600 33,000 23.57 1,250 2,300 1,050 
Source: van Gelder (2010: Table 2).  
By comparison, the meat trade in Australia and other W stern economies has certain characteristics 
which make managing profit margins easier. Although high profits are not being made in the 
Australian meat industry, the structure and the pricing system do reward good management. Table 24 
indicates the margins in the Australian meat market.  They are not large and processors have to 
maintain high levels of throughput and business effici ncy to accumulate profits. The Australian 
population (approximately 22 million) allows market segmentation, specialization and the targeting of 
niche markets. The cultural mix provides an excellent base for researching what international meat 
markets require. This diversification does not apper to exist in Mongolia.  
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Table 24. Australian wholesale and retail values and retail margins 























Beef Average 240 1.86 446.0 410.3 6.8 10.3 3.5 
  Average 365 1.90 693.5 638.0 6.8 10.3 3.5 
  Average 450 1.72 774.0 712.1 6.8 10.3 3.5 
Sheep Average   31 2.93 91.0 83.7 4.5 12.2 7.5 
  Average   42 2.55 107.0 98.4 4.5 12.2 7.7 
  Average   55 2.40 132.0 121.4 4.5 12.2 7.7 
Source: van Gelder (2010: Table 3). 
Table 25 provides information on wholesale and retail prices in Australia. It shows that there are 
considerable differences in retail prices for different meat cuts. These cuts are used in different ways in 
food preparation in Australian households and restaurants. Value is placed on meat colour, tenderness, 
texture, fat content and fat colour. Value is also placed on the ease of cooking and the use to which t e 
meat can be put in the preparation of a whole meal.  















Rump 3.52 4.1 23.90 23.99 84.32 
T-Bone 3.54 4.1 24.04 24.99 88.34 
Sirloin 3.29 3.8 22.34 18.96 62.28 
Round 3.60 4.2 24.48 14.99 53.96 
Topside 4.56 5.3 31.01 13.99 63.79 
Butt Fillet 0.64 0.7 4.35 29.99 19.19 
Silverside 4.60 5.4 31.28 16.99 78.15 
Skirt 0.72 0.8 4.90 10.99 7.91 
Kidney 0.27 0.3 1.84 4.99 1.35 
Brisket 2.72 3.2 18.50 9.99 27.17 
Blade 2.01 2.3 13.63 12.99 26.04 
Y-Bone 2.85 3.3 19.41 8.99 25.66 
Chuck 5.04 5.9 34.27 8.98 45.26 
Rib Plate 2.38 2.8 16.18 4.00 9.52 
Gravy Beef 3.89 4.5 26.46 7.98 31.05 
Rib Fillet 2.1 2.5 14.28 37.99 79.78 
Beef Mince 2.3 2.7 15.64 5.94 13.66 
Lean Mince 10.35 12.1 70.35 8.99 93.00 
Fat 10.48 12.2 71.26 0.14 1.47 
Bone 15.71 18.3 106.83 3.99 62.68 
Loss 1.09 1.3 7.41 4.36 4.75 
Totals 85.64 100.0 582.35   879.36 














Retail Value of  
Australian 
Lamb AU$ 
Leg Chump on 3.6 32.7 16.20 12.99 46.76 
Rack 1.1 10.0 4.95 29.99 32.99 
Short Loin 1.3 11.8 5.85 14.99 19.49 
Shoulder 2.3 20.9 10.35 8.49 19.53 
Neck 0.8 7.3 3.60 5.49 4.39 
Foreshank 0.6 5.5 2.70 9.49 5.69 
Breast and Flap 1.3 11.8 5.85 4.49 5.84 
Total 11.0 100.0 49.50   134.69 
Note: Retail prices obtained from Supermarket, 27 April 2010, Morayfield Qld, Australia. 
Source: van Gelder (2010). 
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Because Australia exports a large proportion of its meat (62 per cent of total production of 236,000 
tons of mutton; 38 per cent of the 428,000 tons of lamb it produces; and 42 per cent of the 2 million 
tons of its beef and veal output) the domestic prices paid for Australian meat are closely allied to the
meat prices obtained by exporters in international m rkets.  
5.4.3 Limitations on Developing the Mongolian Meat Processing Industry 
In studying the current dynamics of the red meat industry, several problems have been identified, 
which are preventing Mongolia from competing successfully in international markets: 
• An underdeveloped financial system that prevents entrepreneurship by limiting access to long-
term funds (see Chapter 2); 
• The inability of entrepreneurs to borrow funds to upgrade abattoirs and accept the Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP), a quality assurance programme; 
• Mongolian land laws prevent herders from owning land, and they therefore do not accept 
responsibility for rangeland use. The government could opt for fixed periods of land-leasing 
arrangements (see Fernandez-Gimenez and Khishigbayar, 2006); 
• The single price paid for meat products irrespectiv of quality specifications; 
• Inappropriate meat handling from the point of slaughter to the retail market. There is no 
regulated sanitary system in place; 
• Insufficient veterinary services because of the poor remuneration currently received by vets; 
• A shortage of individuals who understand the differences in meat quality specifications for 
higher priced international markets. 
Each of these limitations could be overcome. They ar  discussed in the following section. 
5.5 Policies to Improve the Meat Processing Industry 
There are many specific requirements to be addressed if Mongolia is to become competitive in the 
world meat market. The country needs to provide a strong institutional framework for the industry to 
flourish. Two separate organizations to reorganize the Mongolian meat industry are suggested. The 
first organization could be called the Mongolian Meat Industry Board (MMIB). The MMIB would 
represent all the organizations associated with the Mongolian meat industry so that the Government 
would only need to negotiate with and receive information from one organization. The MMIB would 
be directly responsible to the Minister of Food and Agriculture and Light Industry. Under the MMIB 
would be established the Mongolian Meat Administrative Body (MMAB). The long-term objective of 
the MMAB would be to administer the daily operation f issues related to the Mongolian meat 
industry and also to pass on international meat-industry skills to Mongolian people, so that Mongolia 
can work towards engaging in international meat trading. 
The structure and nature of the MMIB and MMAB would need to be debated. However, they should 
be largely independent of the Government in their activities, decision making and budget allocations. 
It is suggested that an international Chief Administrative Officer of the MMAB be appointed for five 
years. This person should be a highly qualified inter ational meat industry person. At an appropriate 
time the MMIB would facilitate a transition from an I ternational Chief Administrative Officer to a 
Mongolian Chief Administrative Officer.  The Chief Administrative Officer would have the power to 
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employ other international personnel, to train Monglian counterparts in areas such as: meat 
specification; HACCP systems; meat industry financil planning and management; abattoir design and 
management; international butchery methods; meat presentation and packaging for domestic and 
international markets; meat product manufacture; industry organization; international meat trading 
methodology and research; international niche market research and identification; international market 
research and business management; domestic market res arch and business management; animal 
breeding, health, management and feeding; feed-lotting and intensive ruminant animal management; 
the structure and design of intensive ruminant housing and yard design; and other matters  necessary to 
achieve the policy objectives. 
Financing for the MMIB and MMAB would come from three sources: (i) the Government, (ii) the 
Mongolian meat industry, through levies, and (iii) from multilateral or bilateral donors. The finances 
should be independent of the Government, should be audited regularly by a certified accounting 
practice, and regular accounting statements should be provided to the Government and the industry. 
Total transparency is essential. 
Below we outline 12 steps which we consider would make a major contribution to developing the 
Mongolian meat industry in the direction of export standard production. These steps do not cover all 
aspects of what the Mongolian meat industry requires, but they are considered to be the issues which 
should to be given priority. They are not listed in order of importance, because the implementation of 
each will involve different time frames.  
The steps are as follows: 
• Establish a financially independent meat industry able to negotiate with the Government with 
a single authoritative voice. All stakeholders should take responsibility for their own 
operations, education and standards. 
• Stimulate price differentials for Mongolian meat products. An international butcher, who 
could work for the Mongolian Meat Administrative Body (MMAB), should teach local 
butchers how to cut up a carcass and extract the sup rior cuts that would be attractive for 
foreign consumers. 
• Gain an understanding of the costs of meat production along the meat market supply chain. 
Attention would be paid to the quality of inputs necessary along the meat processing chain to 
charge a price that would be linked to the quality of the meat. 
• Upgrade one centrally-located abattoir to supervise HACCP standards. International meat 
markets have very high hygienic, packaging and presentation specifications, which have to be 
fulfilled by those wishing to have access to them. 
• Ensure that Mongolian meat for export is slaughtered in official abattoirs. All meat for human 
consumption should be slaughtered under hygienic conditi ns and according to 
internationally-accepted hygiene and animal welfare standards. 
• Introduce leasehold ownership of land to stimulate herder land responsibility. This step would 
encourage herders to look after the pastures, which will stop the desertification of the 
grassland. This action will increase the quality of animals.  
• Make the use of veterinary drugs mandatory. International health standards require that 
animals are cleared of any disease; if they are not, a imal products are banned from entry. 
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• Increase knowledge and labour skills of personnel i modern meat industry technology and 
world best practice. Knowledge, technical expertise in physical operations, communications 
methodology and market supply chain co-ordination are ll critical for the smooth and 
competitive operation of a meat industry. The Australian meat industry also recently 
established a new Meat Industry Strategic Plan, which addresses many of the issues that the 
Mongolian meat industry should also address. The Australian organization, Meat and 
Livestock Australia, has a most informative website, which shares information on many of 
these issues. 
• Develop an industry communications system for effici nt market pricing and technical 
knowledge. To avoid information bottlenecks each contributor along the meat supply chain 
must have access to accurate and reliable information. 
5.6 Summary 
• The current meat processing industry in Mongolia does not conform to international standards 
of production, or to the food safety requirements of importing countries. It will take time for 
Mongolia to achieve the organization, production and food safety standards necessary to 
participate fully in the international red meat market. 
• The Mongolian private sector must form associations, share information and collectively work 
towards becoming consumer focused. The country also needs to provide a strong institutional 
framework for the industry to flourish; a Mongolian Meat Industry Board (MMIB) and a 
Mongolian Meat Administrative Body (MMAB) are suggest d. 
• The red meat industry is also characterized by there b ing no consumer demand or pressure 
for price differentials for different muscles in the animal carcass. This has translated into a 
single price per kilogram paid to herders for animals of a wide range of quality. Herders 
increase their income by selling more or bigger animals not by paying attention to animal 
quality, as in developed international meat trading nations. This price structure has to change. 
Herders need to receive price incentives to care for the quality of the animals. 
• Mongolia could adopt and adapt the measures used in the Australian meat industry to improve 
the process of production, handling, publicity and communications systems.  
• A number of steps are suggested, which could lead Mongolia to achieve trading capability in 
the international higher priced red meat markets. 
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Appendix 2. Abattoir capacity in Mongolia, 2010 





















1 Akhangai Hangai Huns LLC 
Taij Trade 
40 200 800   500 Yes Licensed 
2 Just LLC  Bayan 
Uglii Meat Market 
18 80 400   600  Under 
consideration 
3 ET Transit 40 150 1200 15 22 500  Licensed 
4 
Bayan Uglii 
Zeger LLC 10 70   8 150  Licensed 
5 Bulgan 
Hutag-Undur 
Just Agro LLC 
Bulgan Meat Market 
Factory 
15 80 200 15 15 500  Under 
consideration 
6 Darkhan Expo LC 65 240 2000  80 3000 Yes Licensed 
7 
Darkhan-Uul 
Tenger Trade LC 35 200 500   1000 Yes Licensed 
8 Dornod Just Agro LLC 65 240 2000  50 3000 Yes Licensed 




Just Group LLC 
Zavkhan Meat Market 
Factory 
10 80   15 300  Licensed 
11 GOKs Meat Factory 3 20    50 Yes Licensed 
12 Erdenet Progress LLC 40 200 800  45 1000 Yes Licensed 
13 
Orkhon 
Mongema LLC 45 200 1000 36 36 1000 Yes Licensed 
14 Uvurhangai Har Horin Meat LLC 15 60 250   500   
15 Uvs Meat Market 
Factory 
15 80 200 100 100 250  Under 
consideration 
16 Bumnomin LLC 10 30 200 5 50 50  Licensed 
17 
Uvs 
Mon-Tuva LLC 10 30 200 10 10 120  Licensed 
18 Sukhbaatar Just Group LLC 
Meat Market 
15 80 250   500  Licensed 
19 Just Group LLC Slot 
hole, initial process 
factory 
45 200 1000  50 500 Yes Licensed 
20 
Selenge 
Gatsuurt LLC 20 100 200 52  170   
21 Khovd Baruun Mongol 20 100 300   500  Under 
The Red Meat Processing Industry  
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International LLC consideration 
22 Khovsgol Just Group LLC  40 200 800 24 40 1000 Yes Licensed 




Eviin Huch LLC 15 80 300   300 Yes Licensed 





Mongol Meat Expo 
LLC 









Just Agro Meat 
Market LC 
18  1000 120 120 6000 Yes Licensed 
29 Ulaanbaatar Just Group LLC Slot 
hole, initial process 
factory 




Meat Export LLC      750  Licensed 
31 Ulaanbaatar Davshil Trade 15 80 300   300  Licensed 
Total 924 4,070 21,500 456 831 42,540   
Just Group (%) 30% 29% 32% 41% 39% 31.5%   
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